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L INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the nature and 
function of contract law in a centrally planned economy. The econ-
omy chosen here is that of the Soviet Union. This study has been 
divided into two parts; the first part deals with the role of plan 
and contract in domestic trade, the second part deals with the 
place of contract and plan in the foreign trade of the Soviet Union. 
The institution of contract in the Soviet Union, for purposes 
of domestic trade, is but a legal expression of the operational in-
dependence of the various state enterprises working to discharge 
their respective responsibilities under an overall plan. It will be 
seen that to a large extent the plan itself would be an empty 
slogan without the mechanism of contract enabling these enter-
prises to enter into reciprocal money-commodity exchanges on a 
footing of equality. This promotes economic rationality and calcu-
lability within the socialist economy. 
An attempt will also be made in Part I to examine the nature 
of contractural relations between, as well as the limits on the 
freedom to contract enjoyed by, the various economic units oper-
a ting within Soviet society. This will be done by examining the 
most important substantive and procedural principles of contract 
law relating to the production and sale of producer and consumer 
goods in the Soviet Union. 
Also examined in Part I is the machinery for the resolution of 
contractual disputes in the Soviet Union. The machinery examined 
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is the special system of economic courts called the State Ar-
bitrazh. Apart from its crucial role in the resolution of economic 
disputes, the State A rbitrazh will also be seen to serve as a watch-
dog over the plan-implementing process as a whole. 
Part II focuses on the legal mechanics of Soviet foreign trade. 
Special attention is paid to the major procedural and substantive 
principles of Soviet import-export law. Parallels between the law 
of domestic contracts and the law of foreign contracts will be 
drawn where possible, and the role of planning agencies in foreign 
trade will also be examined. Finally, Part II will examine some 
pertinent contractual problems of East-West joint ventures in the 
Soviet Union within the context of the national plan. This part will 
also be attentive to the special peculiarities of the Soviet foreign 
trade system and law in the formation and execution of foreign 
contracts, and in the resolution of contractual disputes - both in 
the import-export field and in the field of joint ventures. 
IL PART I: 
DOMESTIC TRADE AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY 
A. An Overview of the Machinery for Implementing the Plan: 
The Institutions of Contract and Arbitrazh 
During the early revolutionary years of the Soviet Union, an 
attempt was made to administer the economy without the instru-
ment of contract. On August 30, 1918, a decree ordered enterprises 
to place their production at the disposal of the state agencies which 
distributed it. In turn, enterprises were to apply to state agencies 
for materials needed. These transactions were settled exclusively 
"by bookkeeping entries without the use of monetary units." 1 Cen-
tralized supply and distribution of materials, products and food 
were carried out, to quote Venediktov, "almost exclusively in the 
form of administrative legal norms and acts and left almost no 
place for civil law transactions."2 
1. Loeber, Plan and Contract Performance in Soviet Law. The Impact of Planning 
Acts on the Performance of Delivery Contracts in the Post-War Practice of the US.S.R. 
State Arbitrazh, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 128, 128 (1964). 
2. Venediktov, Grazhdanskoye zakonodatel'stov v period inostrannoy voemoy in-
terventsiyii grazhdenskoy voiny 1918-20 (Civil Legislation in the Period of Foreign 
Military Intervention and the Civil War 1918-1920), in LGU, 210 UCHYONYYE ZAPISKI 
(SCHOLARLY NOTES) 70, 96, 117 (1955). 
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Within a few years this led to a breakdown in the exchange of 
goods and there emerged in place of the exchange of goods a pri-
vate market of purchase and sale trade. Lenin himself urged in 
1921 that "we must now admit this if we do not want to hide our 
heads under our wings, if we do not want to be like those who do 
not realize when they are beaten .... "3 As a result, contracts were 
reintroduced and contract law was codified in the then newly 
enacted Civil Codes.' 
With the Five-Year Plan of 1928, which introduced large scale 
planning within the economy, contracts between socialist organ-
izations became planned contracts. The main feature of planned 
contracts is that planning predetermines the essential conditions 
of the contract. A planning (or administrative) act called the 
nariad is addressed to the appropriate enterprise which must then 
implement the plan through a concrete contract. 
This integration of political and economic authority is a basic 
concept of socialism requiring state ownership of the means of pro-
duction and the direction of economic life by the state economic 
plan. The Council of Ministers is responsible for making and ex-
ecuting the plan, and is the highest executive and administrative 
organ of the state. It is served by four main administrative bodies: 
The State Planning Commission (Gosplan), which draws up the 
Five-Year annual and quarterly plans for the Soviet Union as a 
whole; the State Bank (Gosbank), which supervises the entire 
credit and financial structure of the national economy; the Econ-
omic Council (Ekonomsoviet), which coordinates the work of the 
various economic ministries and controls trade among them; and 
the Council of Defense. The members of the Council of Ministers 
are heads of various economic and other ministries. 5 
Plans for distribution begin with the submission of applications 
by the enterprises to their superior agencies showing the re-
quirements of each enterprise for the coming year. These applica-
tions are studied and corrected when necessary by these agencies. 
They are then forwarded to the Republican and All-Union 
ministries from which they are forwarded to Ekonomsoviet and to 
3. V. LENIN, 9 SELECTED WORKS, 288-89 (1937). 
4. For further discussion of these early principles of Soviet contract law see V. Gsov-
SKI, I SOVIET CIVIL LAW 415, 447, 448-84 (1948). For English text of the RSFSR Civil Code 
see id., Vol. II, at 16 (1949). 
5. Berman, Commercial Contracts in Soviet Law, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 191-94 (1947) 
[hereinafter cited as Berman, Commercial Contracts]. 
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Gosplan. In this way the applications move up from the immediate 
producers and consumers to the highest planning organs.6 
There are many plans; for example, All-Union plans, Repub-
lican plans, plans of Councils of National Economy and plans of 
enterprises. The plans of enterprises, i.e. , the plans of those en-
tities which enter into contracts with each other, do not specify to 
whom the products of the enterprise should be delivered, nor do 
they lay down who will supply the enterprise with the necessary 
materials. The plan of an enterprise directs its internal operation 
and is not concerned with creating relations with buyers or sup-
pliers. Thus, under article 43 of the Statute of the Socialist State 
Production Enterprise,7 an enterprise must draft its own "long-
term and annual plans for all types of its activity," and under article 
45 an enterprise is specifically required to "work out an expanded 
annual technical-industrial-financial plan ... [as well as] quarterly 
and monthly plans for production and economic activity .... " Under 
the same article an enterprise is further required to "establish in-
dependently the quantitative and qualitative plan indicators for 
[its] shops, sections, services ... and other subdivisions."8 
The first step in establishing relations between enterprises 
(e.g., between buyer and seller) is taken when the superior agency 
of the enterprise concerned (e.g., a Council of National Economy) 
issues its production, delivery and distribution plans. Once the 
All-Union plan has been approved, each superior agency receives 
its plan showing the types and quantities of products allocated to 
it for the given planning year. The superior agency distributes 
this allocation through its sales organizations among the enter-
prises under its jurisdiction. The allocation begins with the agency 
notifying a subordinate enterprise of the types of quantities of the 
materials and funds (fondy) allocated to that enterprise for the 
planning year. The issuance of fondy is technically a certification 
of the purchaser's right to procure goods subject to delivery 
under the nariad.9 This, however, does not give the enterprise the 
6. Id. at 199. See also Zile, Law and the Distribution of Consumer Goods in the 
Soviet Union, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 212, 233-34 (1964). 
7. Confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 1965, [1965), Sob. post 
S.S.S.E. Nos. 19-20, item 155. For English text see W. BUTLER, THE SOVIET LEGAL 
SYSTEM-LEGISLATION AND DOCUMENTATION 169 (1978). 
8. See Loeber, supra note 1, at 134. 
9. Speer, Contract Rights and the Planned Economy: Peaceful Co-existence Under 
the 1969 Soviet Statutes on Deliveries of Goods, 3 L. & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 510, 513-15 (1971). 
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right to claim the material either from the superior agency allocat-
ing it or from the prospective supplier who is, in any case, assigned 
only at a later stage. The right of a consumer enterprise to claim 
the allocated material arises only after the superior agency has 
issued a delivery or distribution order to a supplier and the sup-
plier and consumer have concluded a contract on the basis of such 
an order.10 
The function of notification is to enable the consumer enter-
prise to specify to the superior agency the precise nature of its 
operational needs in terms of the quantity and quality of the mate-
rial in question. After receipt of such specification the superior 
agency forwards the documentation to its sales department, which 
then issues production and delivery orders to a supplier-enter-
prise. The issuance of production and delivery orders marks the 
second stage in which the orders are treated as legally binding ad-
ministrative orders. These orders are not subject to change or 
cancellation even by agreement of the parties.11 It also marks an 
important stage in the planning process, for it is here that plan 
and contract meet. 
Two types of delivery orders must be distinguished. The first 
is the order naming the supplier and buyer individually and 
creating an obligation on the part of the named parties to conclude 
a contract. The second type of delivery order is one which names 
the supplier but leaves the name of the buyer blank and instead 
names the superior agency (e.g., a Council of National Economy) 
as recipient. This type of order creats no obligation to establish 
contractual relations. The product listed in the delivery order 
must, however, be distributed in the form of distribution orders 
among the superior agency's subordinate organizations within fif-
teen . days.12 A distribution order from a superior agency creates 
an obligation to establish contractual relations between the sup-
10. Loeber, supra note 1, at 136. See also Comment, The Role of State Arbitrazh 
Under the New Conditions of Economic Management in the Soviet Union, 116 U. PA. L.R. 
1285, 1290 (1968) [hereinafter cited as State A rbitrazh ]. 
11. Zamengof, Combining Guidance by State Plan and Economic Independence in 
Contractual Independence and Contractual Relationships, 2 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 27 (No. l, 
1963). 
12. Decree of June 30, 1962, §§ 2-3; [1962), Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 12, item 94; Statute 
on Deliveries of Products, §§ 7 and 70, as amended [hereinafter cited as 1962 SDP), cited in 
Loeber, supra note l, at 139. 
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plier and buyer named therein.13 Another type of distribution 
order is the unloading order of a buyer to the supplier, requiring 
delivery to a third party. That order is based on an already ex-
isting contract between the buyer and supplier and therefore does 
not establish contractual relations between them.14 
The two types of delivery orders and the first type of distribu-
tion order are planning acts insofar as they emanate from a superior 
planning agency. Such acts are issued at monthly or quarterly inter-
vals, but in case of disruptions of the plan or in other cases of 
need, delivery and distribution orders are issued on an ad hoc 
basis for individual deliveries.15 In this way the transformation of 
the plan into individual acts is a continuous process. 
The delivery and distribution orders (but not the unloading 
orders) bind their recipients, but, as Loeber points out, they bind 
only "administratively, i.e., through administrative channels of sub-
ordination."16 They do not create obligations of delivery or pay-
ment, for these can arise only from a contract. Yet w bile planning 
acts do not replace contracts, most Soviet jurists, as well as non-
Soviet writers such as Berman, affirm that they create a "pre-con-
tract obligation" on the parties to conclude a civil-law contract.11 
Both pre-contract disputes and contractual disputes are adju-
dicated by a special system of economic courts called the State Ar-
bitrazh. The regular courts lack jurisdiction over disputes be-
tween socialist enterprises. A rbitrazh is an administrative agency, 
though it acts to a considerable extent in a judicial manner. For 
example, Point 88 of the A rbitrazh Rules requires that 
the State Arbitrazh agencies ... set forth in their awards the 
essence of the dispute, and the statements and explanations of 
the parties, the experts, and the enterprises, organizations and 
institutions not parties to the dispute. The award should also 
state the considerations by which the Arbitrazh agency was 
guided in arriving at it, with reference to the laws, decrees and 
13. Instruction of Dec. 18, 1962, § 1, 22 Sbornik 12-15, (1962), cited in Loeber, supra 
note l, at 139. 
14. See 1962 SDP, supra note 12, at§ 28 (and 373) and of goods§ 15 (and§ 76); Instruc-
tion of Dec. 18, 1962. § 8, 22 Sbornik 12-15. 
15. Loeber, supra note l, at 140. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. See also Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 204. 
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orders of the government, and other normative acts, as well as 
the principal evidence in the case.18 
Disputes arising between enterprises within a single ministry 
are decided by Departmental A rbitrazh. Contractual disputes be-
tween agencies belonging to different ministries are decided by 
State Arbitrazh at Union and Republican levels.19 Each organ of 
the State A rbitrazh is subordinated to a higher administrative 
body, e.g., the Council of Ministers of the USSR or the Council of 
Ministers of the various union and autonomous republics. The ad-
ministrative body appoints A rbitrazh members and has power to 
reverse or modify State A rbitrazh decisions. A case ·may be 
brought before State Arbitrazh in any one of four ways: first, at 
the request of the appropriate Council of Ministers; second, at the 
request of a superior organ of State A rbitrazh; third, on its own 
initiative; or fourth, at the suit of an interested party. In any of 
the four ways the 1963 Rules for Consideration of Economic 
Disputes by State A rbitrazh Agencies provides that "represen-
tatives of the public and of the active membership of the economic 
unit may participate in meetings of State A rbitrazh agencies."20 
In every case the Arbiter has broad powers. He may question 
the parties and come to their aid so that no party gains an unfair 
advantage over the other due to ignorance of the law, etc. He may 
decide a case on an entirely new basis, including one not argued by 
the parties, or he may give judgment beyond the claim or counter-
claim of either party. 21 
An order for specific performance is almost always made. 
This is so regardless of whether or not damages have been 
ordered to compensate loss arising from a breach of contract.22 
This constitutes an important principle of Soviet contract law and 
is discussed below at a more appropriate stage. 
Despite its wide powers, A rbitrazh is nevertheless bound by 
law. Article 4 of its Statute provides that State A rbitrazh "shall 
18. Shapkina & Petrov, Commentary on the Rules for the Consideration of Economic 
Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, 3 SOVIET L. & Gov'T 38, 43 (No. 2, 1964). 
19. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 204-05. See also H. BERMAN, 
JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 124, et seq. (1963); Loeber, supra note 1, at 131-32. 
20. The New Rules for Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration 
Agencies, 2 SOVIET L. & Gov·T 57, 59 (No. 3, 1963-64). See also Fal'kovich & Barash, Com-
mentary on the Rules for Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitrazh Agen-
cies, 2 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 55, 56 (No. 4, 1964). 
21. See Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18. 
22. See Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 207. 
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be guided in its activity by laws of the USSR, edicts of the 
Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees and regulations 
of the USSR government, other normative acts, and the present 
statute."23 As Loeber has observed, however, "[d]isputes before 
A rbitrazh are not necessarily legal in character, they may also in-
volve questions of economic expediency .... A rbitrazh decisions 
have often an operative rather than a judicial character: they are 
part of day-to-day economic administration."24 
Under the Order of the USSR Council of Ministers of July 23, 
1959, "On Improving the Work of State Arbitrazh," enterprises 
are required to present their claims to the other party and take all 
possible steps to settle controversies before submitting an action 
to an Arbitrazh agency.25 Point 8 of the Arbitrazh Rules of 1963 
also requires prior direct negotiation between the parties within 
ten days after a pre-contract dispute has arisen. 26 A rbitrazh can-
not consider a case unless this has taken place. If within an addi-
tional ten days the dispute cannot be settled by negotiation, the 
party that proposed the original terms must submit the dispute to 
A rbitrazh. Failure to do so signifies acceptance of the terms pro-
posed by the other party. 27 
Disputes arising from existing contracts must be submitted 
within one month of breach and the other party must respond to 
the claim within that time.28 The claim must specify the name of 
the enterprise against which the claim is being made, the nature 
of the breach and the legal basis of the claim as well as the nature 
of the relief sought. 
The Rules govern all cases unless otherwise provided for, as 
for example, in cases involving shipments. Article 76 of the Prin-
ciples of Civil Legislation of the USSR makes separate provision 
for shipments.29 The period of limitation laid down under this 
23. Statute on State Arbitrazh Attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, Confirmed 
by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Jan. 18, 1974, [1974], Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 4, 
item 19. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 253. 
24. Loeber, supra note 1, at 146. 
25. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 55. 
26. Point 8 of the Rules of Consideration of Economic Disputes by State Arbitrazhes, 
Decree No. P-4 of State Arbitrazh of the USSR Council of Ministers, July l, 1963, 2 SOVIET 
STATUTES & DECISIONS 26 (No. 1, 1965) [hereinafter referred to as 1963 Rules]. 
27. Point 9 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. 
28. Id., Point 10. 
29. Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics, 
adopted by law of the USSR Supreme Soviet Dec. 8, 1961 [hereinafter cited as 1961 Prin-
ciples]. For English text see W. BuTLER, supra note 7, at 393. 
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statute is six months, while claims for fines must be presented 
within 45 days. The 1963 Rules, therefore, do not apply to such 
cases. 
Disputes are considered in the area of jurisdiction of an A rbi-
trazh agency within which the respondent is located. In cases in 
which both parties are located in different Republics or regions, 
the area of jurisdiction is the plantiff's choice.30 
Liberman asserts that Arbitrazh agencies can initiate suits 
against, for example, a supplier if they receive information 
(through the press or any other source) to the effect that goods 
shipped are of inferior quality.31 Individual cases may be submit-
ted by Arbitrazh to the procurator's office for the application of 
penal sanctions against managers found guilty of mismanagement 
leading to inferior products.32 Fal'kovich and Barash point out that 
a superior agency may also initiate an action on behalf of a subor-
dinate enterprise.33 
A rbitrazh may join, on its own initiative, one or more parties 
as respondent[s] to a dispute before it. Likewise, it may sever a 
respondent from the proceedings.34 As will be discussed later,35 
Arbitrazh can award costs to either party, although normally 
costs are levied against the respondent in proportion fo the 
amount of the claim granted. 
All awards are binding and must be complied with voluntarily 
within the period stated for compliance in the award (Point 97 of 
the 1963 Rules), or if there is no such compliance, the plaintiff may 
petition to the arbitration agency for an order of compulsory ex-
ecution.36 If A rbitrazh awards are not voluntarily executed in time 
30. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 59. See Point 14(c) of the 1963 Rules, supra 
note 26. 
31. Liberman, Arbitration Practice in Cases Involving the Quality and Completeness 
of Production, 3 SOVIET L. & GOV'T 47, 52 (No. 2, 1964). 
32. See the case of the Uzbek Tractor Assembly Plant, id. at 54, where the pro-
curator's office, after receiving the record of an Arbitrazh agency showing mismanagement 
in a case, decided not to prosecute because the individual concerned had been issued a warn-
ing. 
33. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 60; Point 6 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. 
34. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 60. 
35. See text accompanying note 212, infra. 
36. Point 98 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. Shapkina & Petrov thus regard all 
awards as having "the force of writs of execution." Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18, at 44. 
Under point 101 of the 1963 Rules, awards are said to have "the force of documents of execu-
tion." 
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the guilty party may be fined. 37 Under Point 101 of the Rules, 
monetary awards (damages and fines) are executed through banks 
upon order of an Arbitrazh agency. Under Article 58 of the Prin-
ciples of Civil Procedure of the USSR,38 orders to confiscate prop-
erty in kind, evictions, etc., can be executed through bailiffs.39 
B. P/,an, Contract and the Principle of Economic Independence 
1. THE SCOPE FOR OPERATIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
The Party Program and the resolution of the November, 1962, 
Plenum of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee called for greater cen-
tralization in the planning of the economy as well as for expansion 
of economic independence of enterprises within the framework of 
a unified economic plan. 40 A legal expression of this independence 
is the contract. 
In view of the pervasive effect of planning in a socialist 
economy, economic "independence" and "freedom" of contract 
must be understood as operating within the framework of the gen-
eral plan. In this way, planning cannot but influence contract law. 
What is officially called "the economic independence and initiative 
of the enterprise"41 can, however, be seen to be developing in 
three directions. First, in that range of contracts concluded be-
tween enterprises on their own initiative and in the absence of an 
obligatory plan assignment, one enterprise selects another party 
and enters into contractual relations for the delivery of consumer 
goods or other industrial goods. As will be seen below, in 1969 new 
statutes were enacted which gave enterprises greater room 
within which to exercise their initiative in selecting their own sup-
pliers of consumer goods.42 With respect to other commodities, the 
37. Point 99 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. See also Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 
18, at 44; summary statement of the 1963 rules entitled The New Rules of Consideration of 
Economic Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, supra note 20, at 60. 
38. 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 
393. 
39. Shapkina & Petrov, supra note 18, at 44. See also The New Rules for Considera-
tion of Economic Disputes by State Arbitration Agencies, supra note 20, at 60. 
40. For text of the November 1962 resolution, see 14 CURRENT DIG. SOVIET PRESS 12 
(No. 48, 1962). 
41. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, art. l, para. l, Confirmed by 
Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 4, 1967 [1965], Sob. post. S.S.S.R. Nos. 19-20, 
item 155. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169. 
42. See 18 EKONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA (1969) for text of the Statute on Deliveries of 
Products Intended for Production and Technical Use [hereinafter cited as 1969 SDP]. See 
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market quotas of which are not covered by the plan, decrees were 
passed in 1957 and 1960 by the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet 
Republic (RSFSR) Council of Ministers granting trade agencies 
the right of unrestricted purchase of such commodities.43 
Similarly, Article 84 of the Regulations on the Economic 
Council of the Economic Administrative District (1957) granted 
the Council the power to permit its subordinate enterprises to sell 
at will, to state enterprises, industrial products for which no mar-
ket quota was provided under the plan. 44 Another decree entitled 
the "Enlargement of the Rights of Enterprise Directors" confer-
red on these officials the power to accept orders from other enter-
prises for the production of castings, forgings, stampings, machine 
parts, etc., made from a customer's materials, provided that this 
did not negatively affect fulfillment of the plan for production of 
products for sale in the models approved for the factory. They 
were also granted the power to enter into construction and erec-
tion contracts with other enterprises. 45 
Berman reports that with the increase of directors' authority, 
there has been a corresponding increase of personal liability for 
failure to perform assigned duties. This has given rise to the con-
cept of "economic crime" for which a director may be punished. 
Examples of "economic crime" include: "breach of technological 
discipline," production of goods of inferior quality, and malicious 
non-fulfillment of contracts.46 
The scope of these initiatives is always limited, and any free-
dom of initiative, if such freedom exists at all, is usually created 
by a prior enabling decree or law.47 The official view is that with 
th~ consolidation of communism, greater freedom of contract will 
emerge: "As the material and technical base for communism is 
18-19 ECONOMICHESKAIA GAZETA (1969) for text of the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer 
Goods [hereinafter cited as 1969 SDG]. 
43. Decrees of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, Dec. 19, 1957, and Dec. 5, 1960. Sob. 
post. R.S.F.S.R. [1958], No. 6, item 62; [1960], No. 42, item 207, cited in Zamengof, supra note 
11, at 27 n.1. 
44. [1957], Sob. post. S.S.S.R., No. 12, item 121, cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32 
n.1. 
45. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Enlargement of the Rights of 
Enterprise Directors, Aug. 9, 1955, [1955], Postanovleniia TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov 
S.S.S.R. po voprosam promyshlennosti i stroitel'stva za 1952-1955 gg., Gozpolitizdat, 91 
(Moscow 1956), cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32 n.2. 
46. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at, 194-195. 
47. See Zamengof, supra note 11, at 27. 
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strengthened, as the country's productive forces develop and the 
shortage of industrial production is reduced, the range of such 
relationships will expand."48 Freedom of contract in this sense is 
not to be regarded as a natural right but rather as a right emerg-
ing from progressing social conditions.49 
The second trend revealing some freedom of initiative among 
enterprises is found in "the expansion of the range of items arrived 
at by agreement between the parties in compulsory relationships 
arising out of plan assignments that are obligatory for both par-
ties and out of contracts based thereon, with a corresponding di-
minution in the items determined by plan."50 Again, the scope for 
such initiative is limited and has been described by Zamengof as 
being dependent on "further improvement in the planning pro-
cess."51 One such improvement was the 1965 Statute, described 
below. 
The third area of initiative lies in the general reduction of de-
tailed mandatory instructions from planning agencies to their 
subordinate agencies. This reduction has left the subordinate 
agencies greater overall discretion to delimit their own conditions 
and terms of contract. Some progress has been made in this direc-
tion by the 1965 and 1969 statutes, as will be discussed below.52 
The three areas discussed, however, merely describe the degree 
of potential freedom-actual freedom being possible only where 
there are enabling statutes (such as the 1965 and 1969 statutes). 
It is also clear that where a planning act imposes conditions 
(e.g., regarding the subject-matter of the contract or the time for 
fulfillment) the parties cannot contravene those conditions either 
by agreement or by arbitration. 53 In the event of conflict between 
contract and plan, the latter prevails.54 
The parties to a contract cannot rescind that contract or 
modify its terms if such rescission or modification conflicts with 
48. Id. 
49. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 141. 
50. See Zamengof, supra note 11, at 27. 
51. Id. 
52. See Section B sub-section 2 and Part A Section D of this study, infra. 
53. Loeber, supra note l, at 150; Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29. 
54. Point 15 of the Decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, Dec. 19, 1933, 
[1933], Sots. Zak. S.S.S.R., No. 73, art. 445; art. 52 of the Statute on Deliveries of Products 
for Equipment and Production; art. 48 of the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods, 
cited in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29 n.18. 
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the plan. 55 If, however, the contract is a voluntary one, rescission 
should be possible and, likewise, if any of the terms of an obliga-
tory contract have been left to the discretion of the parties, those · 
terms may be modified or cancelled by agreement although the 
contract itself cannot be terminated. 
At least one Soviet writer has suggested that the right of can-
cellation of contracts should be given to enterprises even if this 
cancellation conflicts with the plan, provided that cancellation is 
required by changed circumstances and that its overall aim is the 
better implementation of the plan: 
However, since [the contract] is conditioned in the final 
analysis by the requirements of the economic law of planned, pro-
portional development of the economy, and since the role of the 
contract is that of an auxilliary to the plan, this rule [concerning 
the inability of parties to cancel an obligatory contract], it would 
seem, would be subject to exception specifically in cases in 
which, as a consequence of various circumstances, further main-
tenance of the contract might become an obstacle to proper ex-
ecution by economic organizations of the plans established for 
them. This would apply when cancellation or modification, if it 
does not threaten disruption of proportions established by plan, 
could at the same time promote the most successful fulfillment of 
these plans, reinforcement of cost-accounting, economy, and 
more rational and effective utilization of resources in money and 
materials. Specifically, it would seem that cancellation of a con-
tract would be entirely permissible, regardless of whether or not 
the plan assignment on which it was based has been cancelled, if, 
as a consequence of change in the line of production or introduc-
tion of efficiency measures the purchaser no longer needs the 
products assigned him under the plan and provided for by the 
contract, or if as a consequence of consistent failure on the part 
of the contracted supplier, an economic organization seeks other 
sources for satisfaction of its needs .... 56 
This exception has not been embodied in any legislation and 
its status is therefore uncertain. In fact, Article 33 of the 1961 
Principles of Civil Legislation57 forbids a "unilateral refusal to ful-
fill an obligation ... except in cases provided by law." It is of 
55. Loeber, supra note l, at 159; Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30. 
56. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30. 
57. 1961 Principles, art. 33, para. 4, supra note 29. For English text see W. BUTLER, 
supra note 7, at 393, 404. 
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course possible to argue that a mutually agreed decision to res-
cind is not "unilateral" and, therefore, not covered by Article 33. 
The general rule is that contracts cannot contravene the plan, as 
provided by Article 34 of the 1961 Principles. Loeber, however, 
states that A rbitrazh, in the exercise of its power of day-to-day 
economic administration, can consider questions of "economic ex-
pediency, such as the refusal to buy unwanted products." 58 Ar-
bitrazh can therefore ·exempt a party from taking delivery of (un-
wanted) goods. 
Furthermore, the parties need not even stipulate the plan 
conditions in the contract, though the contract is always deemed 
to be regulated by the conditions specified in the planning act. 
Thus, for example, if the supplier and purchaser carried out the 
delivery and acceptance of goods specified in the planning act be-
fore the time ordained for concluding the contract, that contract 
need not even have been entered into.59 
Point 4 of the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, "On 
Further Improvement of the Procedure For Conclusion of Con-
tracts for Delivery of Equipment and Materials for the Use of En-
terprises and Organizations" (1962), provides that when delivery 
orders issued to a supplier and purchaser contain all the data 
needed for shipment (e.g., quantity, items, quality, delivery dates), 
and if no further agreement between the parties upon other condi-
tions is required, contractual relations are established upon 
receipt and acceptance of the order.60 On the other hand, cancella-
tion or amendment of the plan assignment or the plan itself leads 
to the automatic cancellation or modification of the corresponding 
contract or its terms, as the case may be. This is followed by an 
automatic substitution of the relevant plan conditions, even if no 
further agreement has been made incorporating the plan changes.61 
The "brooding omnipresence" of the plan (to use Holmesian 
phraseology) not only guides contractual relations but also estab-
lishes the range of permitted leeway. It further serves as a 
58. Loeber, supra note 1, at 146. 
59. Decree of May 22, 1959, Sob. post. S.S.S.R. No. 11 item 68; Statute on Delivery of 
Consumer Goods§ 6(4) [hereinafter cited as 1959 SDG]; Statute on Delivery of Products§ 
10(2) [hereinafter cited as 1959 SDP]. 
60. Decree cited by Zamengof, supra note 11, at 28. Article 4 of the 1961 Principles, 
supra note 29 provides that civil rights and obligations arise "from administrative acts ... 
and from planning acts." See also 1959 SDP § 5(3), and 1959 SDG § 6(4), supra note 59. 
61. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30-31; see also Loeber, supra note 1, at 146-47. 
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reminder that contract is an auxiliary tool in the implementation 
of the plan and cannot be used as an instrument for monitoring the 
plan, for correcting planning errors or for exercising economic or 
contractual independence contrary to the plan. 
It is however, noteworthy that Point 8 of the 1962 decree 
mentioned above, as well as Article 62 of the 1965 Statute on the 
Socialist State Economic Enterprise62 gives enterprises the right 
to refuse to sign contracts for the supply to them of products that 
are either "superfluous," "unneeded," or in excess of their needs. 
The refusal must be made within ten days of the receipt of a de-
livery order. If the refusal is not communicated to the supplier 
within the time limit, delivery, generally, must take place as re-
quired in the planning act.63 
Speer is of the view that it was to be left to the enterprise re-
jecting the goods to determine whether they were "unneeded." He 
cites a State A rbitrazh holding of 1963 that a purchaser's rejection 
of the goods allocated was the exercise of a right and that the fine 
for failure to contract was not applicable in such cases.~4 A rbitrazh 
practice on this issue, however, is not uniform. In the 1968 case, a 
State A rbitrazh held that even if the p:urchaser had failed to give 
notice of rejection within ten days he was not bound to conclude a 
contract for unwanted goods. 
There appears to be no legislation regarding notification of 
changes in the plan. In particular, there is no allocation of respon-
sibility for notification. The question appears to have been left for 
A rbitrazh agencies to determine on an equitable basis. A rbitrazh 
have freed innocent parties from liability for the non-fulfillment of 
changed plan assignments where such parties were either un-
aware of the changes or informed of the changes too late. In some 
instances, when one of the parties has been held responsible for 
not informing the other of the change, the suit was dismissed with 
costs against the party responsible, particularly if the latter had 
itself brought the suit.65 This practice involves a principle analo-
gous to the common law maxim that "he who comes to equity must 
come with clean hands." Zamengof goes further and advocates 
62. See Section B(2), infra. 
63. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29. See also Maggs, Soviet Corporation Law: The 
New Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, 14 AM. J . COMP. L. 478, 487 
(1965-66); Speer, supra note 9, at 526-27. 
64. Speer, supra note 9, at 527. 
65. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 32. 
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that the party "guilty" of withholding information must be held 
liable for financial and economic loss resulting from failure to 
notify.66 
The case of Myshega Armature Work v. Venikov Armature 
Works 61 illustrates the subordinate position of contract vis-a-vis 
the plan. A contract between two enterprises provided for the de-
livery of 1,230 electric drives by the Venikov Plant to the 
Myshega Plant. A planning act was issued which necessitated a 
change in the number of electric drives required. A local arbitra-
tion board determined that 1000 drives were necessary. When this 
number of drives was not delivered in full, the Myshega Plant filed 
a suit before the State A rbitrazh Commission of the RSFSR Coun-
cil of Ministers. The Commission found that the local Arbitrazh 
agency had erred in fixing the number of drives at 1,000 and that 
the correct figure, under the planning act, should have been 587. 
Since the respondent had delivered this number in full the suit 
was dismissed.68 The State Arbitrazh Commission proceeded on 
the principle that the change required by the planning act was 
automatically written into the contract regardless of the agree-
ment between the parties. The case also shows that even Ar-
bitrazh decisions are subject to review by superior A rbitrazh 
agencies in the event of a nonconformity of an award to the plan. 
While fully acknowledging the overall superiority of the plan, 
Bratus and Alekseev argue that planning agencies should not be 
allowed to exercise "excessive tutelage" over the enterprises so 
that the latter are assured of at least a minimum degree of inde-
pendence or autonomy. To this end, they advocate the maintenance 
of a strict division of functions between planning agencies and 
economic enterprises common between directors of enterprises 
and the enterprise themselves. Planning agencies are those agen-
cies which approve plan assignments, allocate raw materials and 
other resources, and assign equipment and funds to enterprises. 
They do not enter into direct productive or other economic activity, 
do not buy or sell goods, and do not acquire or operate the means 
of production. Bratus and Alekseev are of the view that the divi-
sion of function will minimize excessive control of industrial enter-
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 35 n.24. 
68. The Myshega Armature Works case is summarized in Zamengof, supra note 11, at 
35 n.24. 
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prises by planning agencies, and suggest that this division must be 
sanctioned by law: 
Therefore, there is needed not only a precise delimitation, form-
ulated in law, of the competence of the various planning and reg-
ulatory agencies, but a similar delimitation of the rights and 
duties of the agencies in question, on the one hand, and of the 
rights and duties of socialist enterprises and other cost account-
ing organizations, on the other. It is necessary to protect the 
enterprise against excessive tutelage and administrative zeal on 
the part of the planning and regulating agencies.69 
The foregoing shows that planning affects contracts and sets 
the limits of contractual freedom and operational independence of 
socialist enterprises. Contracts and the relative ease or freedom to 
conclude contracts show the degree of operational independence 
present. At the same time contracts appear to serve as the chief 
instrument for the detailed implementation of the plan itself. Fur-
thermore, the official view is that freedom of contract and opera-
tional independence emerge with the consolidation and improve-
ment of the socialist mode of production. 
In the meantime, the planning process utilizes what Bratus 
and Alekseev have called "the principle of democratic 
centralism."70 This principle, in their opinion, manifests the 
economic independence of enterprises and involves not only the 
working out of details and specifications for the execution of the 
plan, but also a say in the planning process itself. Such input is 
facilitated by providing for the submission of requests and drafts of 
plans to planning agencies and by providing procedures by which 
planning agencies may be asked to withdraw or modify specific plan 
assignments.71 
Berman writes that the modification of plans in compliance 
with requests from enterprises is a "common practice." "In fact," 
he observes, "one sometimes gains the impression from reading 
Soviet legal literature and from talking with Soviet factory direc-
69. Bratus & Alekseev, The Treatment of Legal Problems Involved in the Manage-
ment of the Economy, 3 SOVIET L. AND GOV'T 23, 28 (No. 1, 1964-65). On the definition of 
"cost accounting" the .writers observe: "Actual cost accounting is possible only where 
material values are produced and sold on the principle of recoupment (Vozmezdie) of costs 
... . "Id. 
70. Id. at 26. See also H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 123. 
71. Bratus & Alekseev, supra note 69, at 26. 
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tors and economic officials, that plans are ultimately adapted to 
the needs, capacities, and desires of the enterprises, despite the 
overwhelming weight of bureaucratic controls."72 
A further factor in the direction of economic independence is 
the principle of khozraschet, 728 or "business accountability." The 
principle implies that business enterprises are responsible for 
their debts, have to keep accurate accounts, and that their success 
is measured largely in terms of their profits.73 To give legal ex-
pression to the principle of business accountability, state enter-
prises have come to be regarded as juridical persons who are 
liable for their debts to the extent of their turnover capital, and 
whose property cannot be acquired except by contractual agree-
ment.74 
2. ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE AND THE 1965 REFORMS 
On October 4, 1965, the Statute on the Socialist State Economic 
Enterprise75 was passed. Article 1 declares that the socialist state 
production enterprise shall be the basic link in the national economy 
of the USSR, and that its activity shall be based upon the combina-
tion of centralized guidance with economic independence and in-
itiative of the enterprise. Article 2 provides that the enterprise 
shall work "under the direction of the superior agency in accor-
dance with a national economic plan on the basis of economic ac-
countability [and] shall fulfill its duties and shall enjoy the rights 
connected with such activity, shall have an independent balance, 
and shall be a juridical person."76 This was the first instance of 
legislative recognition of the socialist enterprise as a juridical per-
son. 
Under the Statute rights are stated as belonging to enterprises 
rather than to managers as had tended to be the case previously.77 
72. H. BERM,'i.N, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 103, 140. See also text ac-
companying notes 5 and 6, supra. 
728 • A term used to describe the basis on which state business enterprises enter into 
relations with each other. 
73. Zile, supra note 6, at 218. 
74. Berman, Commerical Contracts, supra note 5, at 196; see also D. GRANICK, 
MANAGEMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL FIRM IN THE U.S.S.R. 24 (1959). 
75. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, supra note 41. For English 
text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169. 
76. Id. at art. 2. For English text see w. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169. 
77. The statute makes detailed provision for the property and assets of the enter-
prise, Part II,§§ 11-40, as well as a host of other rights pertaining to its activities, Part IV 
§§ 41-42. Under § 90 the director acts "in the name of [the] enterprise" rather than inde-
pendently. 
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Maggs suggests that this is significant because the manager was 
"merely a subordinate bureaucrat in a long hierarchy of govern-
ment officials .... The new law, by granting ... rights to the enter-
prise itself, opens the way for future procedural reform which 
would provide real avenues for the enforcement of the rights."78 
Article 47 of the Statute provides that if changes in planned 
tasks are necessary, prior consultation with the enterprise's man-
agement must be carried out. Maggs views this as mere "empty 
language" however, since it cannot be enforced by any impartial 
adjudicative body.79 This implies that there are no procedural safe-
guards for enforcement and also that perhaps Arbitrazh agencies 
are not considered by Maggs to be an "impartial adjucative body." 
In contrast to this view, Hazard regards A rbitrazh agencies as 
providing sufficient protection for the rights of enterprises: "[T]he 
arbitration tribunals have been moving away from the position 
given them when they were brought into being in their present 
form in 1931 .... They have come nearer to the position of a court 
charged with the protection of 'rights' through the stable applica-
tion of law."80 
In the area of planning the most significant moves by the 1965 
laws in favor of independence from the plan are the reduction of 
the number of plan "indicators" by the Statute, and the shift of 
emphasis toward profitability and output sold rather than gross 
output. Prior to this, under a 1954 decree,81 a superior organization 
could set the following plan indicators for the enterprise: (a) out-
put in monetary and physical terms; (b) the basic technical and 
economic indicators of the use of raw materials and equipment; 
(c) number of workers, total wages bill, labor productivity; (d) ex-
penses of production; (e) costs of goods produced; (f) cost of the 
most important man-produced items, and (g) receipts and expendi-
tures. 
78. Maggs, supra note 63, at 485; see also D. GRANICK, THE RED EXECUTIVE 318 (1960), 
where the manager is described as an "organization man, filling a slot in an industrial 
bureaucracy." 
79. Maggs, supra note 63, at 486. 
80. Hazard, Flexibility of Law in Soviet State Arbitration, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA-
TION 120, 129-30 (P. Sanders ed. 1967). 
81. Decree of August 2, 1954. 4 Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel'stva po khozya-
ystvennym voporsam. Sbornik Dokumentov 1917-1957 gg. [Directives of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government on Economic Matters] (1958) 451. Col-
lection of documents for the years 1917-1957 compiled by Malin & Korobov in 4 vols. 
(Moscow 1957-58). Decree cited in Maggs, supra note 63, at 485. 
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After the Reforms of 1965, this list was reduced to the follow-
ing indicators: (a) the volume of sales output; (b) the basic types of 
output; (c) the wages fund; (d) the amount of profit; and (e) pay-
ments to and appropriations from the budget.82 The reduction has 
meant that enterprises fulfill their production on the basis of com-
pleted contracts. Thus, contract terms as to quality, quantity, and 
assortment have replaced many of the commanded indicators 
previously imposed from above.83 
In fact, very often it was this predominance of plan over con-
tract which resulted, in Maggs' opinion, in a lack of flexibility, an 
indifference to the needs of industry, consumers, and the pub-
lic, and an overemphasis on gross output at the expense of quality 
and economy.84 Attempts were made in the 1950's to introduce the 
reduction of operating costs rather than gross output as the 
primary measure of enterprise success. One of the changes which 
has been incorporated in the 1965 Statute has been the creation of 
the right of enterprises to reject unneeded goods.85 The Statute also 
seeks to prevent the production of unwanted goods by providing 
that orders from trade organizations shall form the basis of con-
tracts for the purchase of consumer goods and by prohibiting above-
plan production. This shows a shift away from "production for 
production's sake" toward an emphasis on quality, economy and 
more contractual freedom.86 
Since the goal of the reforms has been to minimize interference 
from planning agencies, the quick settlement of pre-contract 
disputes has assumed greater importance. Thus, disputes over 
items which would previously have been governed by plan indica-
tors must now be decided by the parties in pre-contract bargaining. 
If irreconcilable differences arise during pre-contract negotiations, 
such differences are to be settled in A rbitrazh-ordered pre-contract 
settlements. 
C. Coexistence of Plan and Contract Law in the Soviet Union 
Since contracts appear to play a crucial role in the Soviet econ-
omy, this paper will now examine briefly the important provisions 
82. Maggs, supra note 63, at 486. 
83. State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1307. 
84. Maggs, supra note 63, at 484-85. 
85. Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, art. 62, supra note 41. For 
English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169. 
86. Maggs, supra note 63, at 484-85. 
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of Soviet contract law as declared by statute and contract prin-
ciples that have emerged in the resolution of pre-contract and 
post-contract disputes before Arbitrazh.87 
1. SOME IMPORT ANT SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL 
PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET CONTRACT LAW 
First, some introductory remarks concerning the general 
principles governing purchases and sales are appropriate. Some of 
these principles are similar to the Anglo-American law on the sale 
of goods. Under Soviet law, the seller undertakes to transfer prop-
erty to the purchaser and the latter agrees to accept such prop-
erty and to pay therefore an agreed upon price. Ownership passes 
at the time of the delivery of perishable goods, and, in the case of 
nonperishable goods, on completion of the contract. Risk passes 
with ownership unless the parties agree otherwise, but if the 
goods deteriorate or are destroyed due to delayed delivery, the 
party responsible for the delay bears the responsibility. 88 
The Soviet Constitution places a limitation on what goods 
may be purchased and sold, however, by declaring certain kinds of 
property to be res extra commercium. Property that is not subject 
to sale or purchase because of constitutional prohibitions includes 
land and its natural deposits, waters, forests, railroads, business 
enterprises of all kinds, and buildings.89 A further limitation is im-
posed by the plan itself, which prescribes that certain types of 
goods shall be bought and sold by certain types of enterprises. A 
necessary consequence of this rule is that an enterprise cannot un-
ilaterally change its own production plan. 
Payments for goods bought under contract are based on the 
principle of strict business accountability under which each enter-
prise is liable for its own debts.90 Most payments are made 
through banks so that the entire system operates on the basis of 
what Berman calls "bookkeeping deductions." The chief form of 
payment involves the buyer's acceptance of the payee's demand 
87. Some of these principles have already been discussed or alluded to in the previous 
section. In this section it is therefore appropriate to focus primarily on those rules which 
have either not been covered yet or which require more detailed exposition. 
88. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 213. 
89. USSR Const. Art. 6. cited in Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 215. 
See also Cases 6 and 9, Id. at 227-28. 
90. Art. 2, Statute on the Socialist State Production Enterprise, supra note 41. For 
English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 169. 
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made through the payee's bank. The latter bank then makes the 
demand to the payor's bank. If the buyer does not notify his bank 
of nonacceptance, his bank will debit the buyer's account and pay 
the seller's bank. Other forms of payment take place through let-
ters of credit, checks, or a periodic settlement of accounts called 
"planned payments."91 
The 1961 Principles92 contain some of the most important prin-
ciples of Soviet contract law. Article 4 provides, as indicated 
above, that rights and obligations arise not only from contracts 
but also from planning acts. Article 34 affirms the general princi-
ple that the "content of a contract concluded on the basis of a plan-
ned task must conform to this task." The article also provides that 
differences arising during the conclusion of the contract (i.e., in 
the "pre-contract" stage) should be resolved by A rbitrazh. Article 
36 provides that fines, penalties and forfeitures be awarded in the 
event of the nonfulfillment of a contract, and forbids agreements 
limiting liability. Agreements limiting liability for delivery of 
goods of inferior quality have consequently been held by Ar-
bitrazh to be invalid.93 
Two more principles should be noted. The first is that a breach 
of contract creates a right to damages for the aggrieved party .94 
Monetary awards are not only compensatory but also punitive, and 
the enforcement of such awards is the right of the injured party as 
well as that of the State. The second principle under Article 36 is 
that payment of a fine, penalty or compensation does not release 
the defaulting party from specific performance of the contract. 
Liberman calls this "the principle of real fulfillment of obligation."95 
The principle of specific performance has been described as 
one of the characteristics of Soviet contract law that distinguishes 
it from Western law on the subject.96 One of the principle's chief 
91. Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 220-24. 
92. 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 
393. 
93. Liberman, supra note 31, at 48. 
94. Eletskii Plant v. Division of Sales of Chief Administration of Metal Industry Arbi-
trazh [1938] No. 5 (in Russian) 21, cited in Berman, Commerical Contrats, supra note 5, Case 
24, at 234. 
95. Liberman, supra note 31, at 52. 
96. Loeber, supra note l, at 160. Under the RSFSR CIVIL CODE the injured party has 
the alternative of rejectl.ng performance and suing for damages alone, although Arbitrazh 
practice has been to award performance where to do so would accord with the plan of 
distribution issued for the parties. Berman, Commerical Contracts, supra note 5, at 213-14. 
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purposes is to emphasize the primacy of the plan over contracts. 
Another purpose is to discourage the practice of what has been 
called "mutual amnesty," whereby the parties to a contract both 
agree to waive their rights under it. Such practice, although it 
may be expedient for the parties in the short term, is regarded by 
State Arbitrazh as a long-term threat to the plan and, ultimately, 
to the economy as a whole.97 Thus, a purchaser cannot relieve the 
supplier from his obligation to deliver, regardless of whether or 
not the supplier has paid a fine for late delivery or for 
nondelivery. Nor can the purchaser relieve the supplier from the 
fine itself, for as State Arbitrazh asserted in 1962, "[a]ssessing 
fines from the supplier is not only a right of the consumer, but also 
a duty to the State."98 This is another principle of Soviet contract 
law distinguishing it from nonsocialist systems. 
The Fundamental Principles of Civil Law adopted by the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1961 also provide that liability for 
breach of contract must be founded on fault, unless otherwise pro-
vided by law or by contract. This embodies a principle not sup-
ported by Anglo-American doctrine, which imposes liability for 
breach of contract regardless of fault unless otherwise provided 
by law or by contract. As will be seen later, however, the Soviet 
principle has two important exceptions.99 
The Principles of 1961 also provide that a contract is deemed 
to have been concluded when the parties thereto have reached 
agreement on all its essential points, and that in the event of a 
breach the obligor is obliged to compensate the obligee for all 
resultant loss including loss of "income" (i.e., profits).100 
2. CONTRACT LAW AND A rbitrazh PRACTICE 
In a planned economy, the delivery contract is the most com-
monly found. 101 There are three ways of concluding such a 
contract:102 first, the supplier after receiving the delivery (distribu-
97. Loeber, supra note 1, at 169. 
98. Id. See also Liberman, supra note 31, at 52. 
99 . . See text accompanying notes 148-53, infra. 
100. See Berman, Commercial Contracts, supra note 5, at 213-14 n.78. 
101. Loeber, supra note 1, at 143. Other contracts are for the purchase of farm pro-
ducts-arts. 51-52 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29; contracts for capital construction-
arts. 67-71; and shipment contracts - arts. 72-77. For English text of these Articles see W. 
BUTLER, supra note 7, at 393. 
102. See Articles 44-50 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29. For English text of these 
Articles see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 393. 
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tion) order, i.e. , the nariad, drafts a contract and sends it to the 
buyer named in the nariad.103 If the buyer agrees with the draft he 
returns it with his signature and the contract is concluded. In the 
event of disagreement on the part of the buyer, the buyer must 
draw up a "Protocol of Disagreement" and forward it to the sup-
plier .104 It would appear that the buyer may disagree only on the 
grounds that the proposed contract conflicts in one way or another 
with the plan instructions, or that the instructions leave the point 
in question to be worked out by the parties themselves. If the 
disagreement cannot be resolved by the parties, the supplier must 
file the Protocol with A rbitrazh within ten days.105 Failure to act 
within ten days would lead to the assumption that the supplier 
had accepted the buyer's version of the contract as stated in the 
Protocol.106 In Pavlodarsky Tractor Factory v. Armmashsnabs-
bita, 101 the buyer refused to pay for goods on grounds . the goods 
were incomplete. A lower Arbitrazh agency awarded the purchase 
price to the seller, but State A rbitrazh of the USSR Council of 
Ministers reversed the decision when it became clear that the 
buyer had filed a Protocol of Disagreement describing the type of 
goods it wanted. State Arbitrazh held that the seller, having 
received the Protocol without objecting, was assumed to have ac-
cepted the buyer's proposals.108 
Second, a simplified procedure exists for contracts involving 
products of a value less than 7 ,500 rubles. Upon receipt of a deliv-
ery order the buyer forwards the order to the seller, who is deemed 
to have accepted it if he does not raise any objections within ten 
days. If objections are raised the matter can go to A rbitrazh. 109 
The third and the simplest form is used if the delivery order 
contains all necessary data (e.g., quality, quantity, time for deliv-
ery). The parties named are deemed to have accepted if neither ob-
jects within ten days, and the order becomes binding on both even 
103. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 72; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12. See also State 
A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1289. 
104. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 16(1); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12(3). See also H. 
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 122-24. 
105. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1290. See also Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 
20, at 56. 
106. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, at§ 16(2); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, at§ 12(4)-(5). 
107. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1298. 
108. Id. at 1298-99. 
109. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, §§ 10, 11, 16; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 11(8). See also 
Loeber, supra note l, at 144. 
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if no subsequent contract is concluded on the basis of the order.110 
Any objections must be communicated by the party raising them 
to the agency which issued the order and to the other party. If the 
objections are found to be groundless by the issuing agency, a con-
tract should be entered into by the parties or the matter may go 
to Arbitrazh.111 
Arbitrazh procedure is thus available to resolve two types of 
"pre-contract" disputes. A rbitrazh procedure may be used to com-
pel a party to conclude a contract, as well as to settle disputes over 
the terms of a draft contract. Not all disputes before A rbitrazh 
however are legal in character; there may, for example, be a ques-
tion involving the economic expediency of a particular decision, 
such as the refusal to buy unwanted goods.112 
Another important principle embodied in Soviet contract law 
is that enterprises cannot plead defects in planning as a means of 
avoiding contractual obligations. In Stalingrad Office v. Alchevsk 
Metallurgical Plant, 113 the buyer office of the RSFSR Ferrous 
Metal Sales and Supply Administration sued for a forfeit, alleging 
that the seller had not completed a delivery of cast iron. The pro-
ducer, a metallurgy factory in the Ukranian Republic, claimed to 
be released from liability on the ground that the planning agency 
(the Council of National Economy) had not allocated it enough iron. 
Incomplete delivery was not, it was argued, the producer's fault. 
A rbitrazh held the producer liable on the ground that it was the 
producer's responsibility to ensure an adequate supply and that 
underestimation by the planning agency of the producer's needs 
was not sufficient grounds for release from contractual obliga-
tions.114 
110. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 10(3); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 11(8). See also 
Zamengof, supra note 11, at 28. 
111. Loeber, supra note 1, at 144-45. 
112. Id. at 146; State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1292. Under art. 2 of the Statute on 
State Arbitrazh Attached to the USSR Council of Ministers supra note 23, arbitrazh has a 
wide range of administrative powers. Included among those powers are those associated 
with "socialist legality and state discipline in the fulfillment of plan assignments and con-
tractual obligations" (para. 3), the elimination of "shortcomings in the activity of enter-
prises" (para. 5) and the development of "rational economic links between enterprises" 
(para. 2). Such a power is clearly aimed at providing a legal basis for arbitrazh decisions on 
grounds of economic expediency. For English text of the Statute see W. BUTLER, supra note 
7, at 253. 
113. Loeber, supra note 1, at 148. 
114. Id. 
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In Bobrovsk Insu'lation Factory v. Khar'kov Factory "Elek-
trotyazhmash,"115 the producer could not deliver insulating 
materials under a contract because the permit for its own supply 
of raw materials did not cover the particular raw materials needed 
to make the insulating materials required by the purchaser. State 
A rbitrazh of the Council of Ministers of the U .S.S.R. criticized an 
earlier pre-contract Arbitrazh decision which had compelled the 
producer to enter into a contract with the buyer, and held in favor 
of the producer because of special circumstances which showed 
that "the failure to supply the goods occurred through no fault of 
the Bobrovsk factory (the producer)."116 It was, however, clear that 
Arbitrazh was not abandoning the general principle that a sup-
plier is not relieved from responsibility for not delivering goods 
merely because it failed to receive raw materials. The exception in 
this case was due to certain "special features," including the fact 
that the raw materials received for one of the items were four 
times less ·than the quantity required, and the fact that the buyer 
had not done all it could to adapt insulatins- materials manufac-
tured from other materials. The crucial finding in the case appears 
to be that the initial supply of raw materials did not provide the 
materials actually required for the production of the insulating 
materials. This interpretetation of the case is supported by the 
State Arbitrazh 's disapproval of the pre-contract Arbitrazh deci-
sion which compelled the producer to enter into the contract. The 
case must therefore be taken as affirming not only the general 
rule that inadequate allocation by planning agencies of raw materi-
als is not a ground for release from contractual obligations, but 
also that an exception to the rule may be permitted in certain nar-
rowly defined circumstances. In the following year State Ar-
bitrazh ruled that in case a delivery order demands delivery of 
products for which raw materials are not provided, Arbitrazh 
agencies may "raise the question of eliminating planning mistakes 
that had been made."117 
The USSR State A rbitrazh also issues "Instructive Letters" 
and "Informative Letters." The former are directed to lower Ar-
115. Id. at 149 n.95; H. BERMAN, Justice in the U.S.S.R., COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS supra 
note 5, at 137-38 
116. First reported in SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNOST (SOCIALIST LEGALITY) (No. 10, 
1960). A more complete report later appeared in No. 12 at 77. The latter report is translated 
in J. HAZARD & I. SHAPIRO, THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 127-28 (Vol. II 1962). 
117. Instructive Letter of Dec. 23, 1961, 19-20 Sbornik 8 (1961), Instructive Letter of 
Sept. 23, 1960, 15 id. 79; 12 id. at 7, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 153 n.116. 
27
Dore: Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.
Published by SURFACE, 1980
56 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 8:29 
bitrazh agencies for guidance on matters of substantive law and 
procedure. The latter are answers to inquiries from enterprises. 
The USSR State A rbitrazh has issued a vast body of Instructive 
Letters. One such letter issued in 1958 declared that if a buyer 
personally selects goods from the supplier knowing that the goods 
are different from those specified in the contract, the buyer can-
not later bring an action aginst the supplier for breach of 
contract.118 Another Instructive Letter states that A rbitrazh agen-
cies are generally not allowed to free the debtor from payment of 
fines or penalties, though such agencies may do so "in extra-
ordinary cases if there are legal reasons." 119 The "legal reasons" 
were not defined. In yet another Letter, State A rbitrazh ruled 
that a new agreement reached between a buyer and seller to 
delivery by the due date does not relieve the seller from fines and 
penalties for nondelivery .120 
In 1962 an Instructive Letter121 was issued which should, in 
part, solve the difficulty that arose in the Bobrov case (1960) 
discussed above. In that case, it will be recalled, State A rbitrazh 
criticized the solution of the pre-contract dispute by an arbitral 
agency whereby the producer was compelled to enter into a con-
tract even though its own raw materials permit did not cover the 
particular raw materials needed for discharging the delivery order 
which was the basis of the contract. The Instructive Letter of 1962 
ruled that A rbitrazh agencies should not force parties to enter into 
a contract if the delivery order does not correspond to the produc-
tion plan of the supplier enterprise.122 An argument can be made 
that it should follow from this rule that a contract should not be 
forced on an enterprise whose allocated raw materials do not meet 
the requirements for the effective discharge . of the contract. 
It is possible that in some instances a planning act may itself 
be issued in violation of the procedure or plan of a higher agency. 
In such instances the 1962 Letter provides that Arbitrazh may 
rule that contracts should be concluded in compliance with their 
respective delivery orders. In so ruling, the A rbitrazh would be 
118. Letter of Jan. 16, 1958, 6 Sbornik 35 (1958), cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 151. 
119. Instructive Letter of July 22, 1950, 3 Sbornik 183 (1950), cited in Loeber, supra 
note l, at 151 n.107. 
120. Letter of Aug. 29, 1959, 6 Sbornik 31 (1959). See also Sots. Zak. No. 12, p. 82 (1957); 
id. No. 12, p. 78 (1958), id. No. 9, p. 92 (1963), cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 151 n.108. 
121. Instructive Letter of Oct. 6, 1962, 21 Sbornik 97 (1962), cited in Loeber, supra note 
1, at 152 n.115. 
122. Loeber, supra note 1, at 152. 
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preserving consistency between the planning act and the delivery 
order.123 
Although, as pointed out above, contracts cannot be used to 
correct planning errors, the State Arbitrazh has often exercised 
its jurisdiction in a way that mitigates hardship arising from bad 
planning. This is often done at the pre-contract stage. In one case, 
a producer was ordered to deliver goods which he was to start 
producing only in the following year. The planning agency, upon 
advice from State Arbitrazh, freed the producer from its obliga-
tion to contract and deliver, and assigned the order to another pro-
ducer .124 
In Libknekht P/,ant v. Kuz'min P/,ant, 125 the producer received 
a delivery order from his superior agency which exceeded his pro-
duction program. He informed the other party of his refusal to 
enter into a contract and also notified the superior agency as re-
quired by internal regulations. The other party sued for nondeliv-
ery and asked that a fine be imposed. A rbitrazh dismissed the suit 
because the producer had not accepted the delivery order and had 
informed all parties concerned of his nonacceptance. A rbitrazh 
held thatthe party suing should have applied to the superior agency 
for allocation of another supplier .126 
The above instances show that planning errors are usually 
corrected in the pre-contract stages either by decision of Ar-
bitrazh or by informal administrative procedures. Such informal 
administrative procedures are often adopted upon recommenda-
tion from A rbitrazh to a superior planning agency .127 It has also 
been established that correction is possible by A rbitrazh even 
after the contract has been concluded.128 
3. CHANGE OF PLANNING ACT AND READJUSTMENT OF 
LIABILITY 
Correction is, of course, always possible through the issuance 
of new planning acts. Upon the issuance of new planning acts, as 
123. Instructive Letter of Oct. 6, 1962, 21 Sbornik 97 (1962), cited in Loeber, supra note 
1, at 152 n.115. 
124. Instructive Letter of Sept. 23, 1960, 15 id. at 83, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 
153 n.118. 
125. [1957] 6 Sbornik 40 Loeber, supra note l, at 153 n.119. 
126. Libknekht Pl,ant v. Kuz'min Pl,ant, 6 Sbornik 49 (1957), cited in Loeber, supra note 
1. at 153. 
127. Instructive Letters of 1960, supra note 124; 1962, supra note 123; see text accompa-
nying notes 122-25, supra. 
128. The Bobrovsk Insulation Factory Case, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 149 n.95. 
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indicated in the previous section, the new plan instructions are not 
only to be incorporated by new agreements into existing con-
tracts, but several Soviet writers such as Zamengof, Ioffe, 
Krasnov and Mints are of the view that new plan instructions are 
automatically substituted into existing contracts, even if new 
agreements for their incorporation have not been concluded.129 
In the case of Warehouse of the Latvian SSR v. Penza Ware-
house, 130 the supplier was under an obligation to deliver a certain 
quantity of watches to the buyer. After the specifications had 
been agreed upon, the All Union Chief Trade Administration 
changed the delivery plan and the specifications. The parties failed 
to incorporate this change into their contract, but the supplier 
delivered a smaller quantity of watches in compliance with the 
new plan. The buyer sued under the original contract for delivery 
of the balance. State Arbitrazh dismissed the claim, holding that 
insofar as the supplier had performed in compliance with the cor-
rected plan he was not guilty of nondelivery .131 This holding sug-
gests that new planning instructions supersede the old and are 
automatically incorporated into existing contracts even without a 
new agreement. 
Such automatic incorporation of new planning instructions 
takes place only in cases involving parties that are both under the 
jurisdiction of the agency issuing the new plan. In cases involving 
plan changes ordered by an authority to which only one of the con-
tracting parties is subordinate, the change does not affect the 
original contract rights of the other partner. In such cases State 
A rbitrazh emphasizes the duty of the planning agency to assign a 
new buyer to the other party to the contract. For example, the 
State A rbitrazh Instructive Letter of February 18, 1959 describes 
a case in which the supplier delivered goods to wholesale ware-
houses of the RSFSR Trade Administration, which at the request 
of its warehouses unilaterally changed the quantity of goods to be 
delivered. Arbitrazh ruled that the RSFSR Trade Administration 
was obliged to inform the supplier of other buyers willing to pur-
chase the balance.132 
129. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30-31 n.22. See also Loeber, supra note 1, at 155; In-
structive Letter, July 6, 1955, 3 Sbornik 194, cited in Loeber, supra note l, at 126 n.132. 
130. 14 Sbornik 58 (1960). 
131. Id. 
132. Instructive Letter of Feb. 18, 1959, 9 Sbornik 19 (1959). 
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If, however, the superior agency of the party ordering the 
change of a planning act seeks and reaches agreement with the su-
perior agency of the other contracting party, the change of plan 
becomes binding on both parties.133 In Novo-Kramatorskiy Ma-
chine-Building Plant v. Izhorskiy Plant, 134 the seller contracted to 
deliver three sets of equipment to the buyer. Two more sets were 
ordered by the superior agency of the buyer, and the buyer was 
informed of the new order by the seller. The buyer refused to ac-
cept delivery of the two additional sets. The seller sued for 
recovery of his costs, for which A rbitrazh held the buyer liable.135 
The rule allowing a party to reject delivery orders within ten 
days136 also applies to plan changes affecting contracts that are 
concluded by the mere acceptance of a delivery order. In such 
cases, a plan change is deemed to be accepted by the parties if 
neither raises objections or demands an additional agreement 
within ten days. 137 Zamengof asserts that the cancellation or 
amendment of a plan assignment on the basis of which a contract 
has been concluded would automatically involve cancellation or a 
corresponding amendment of the obligation itself.138 
Moreover, if account be taken of the shortcomings that still exist 
in the day-to-day functioning of the planning agencies, as a conse-
quence of which changes in plans are not always transmitted to 
economic organizations in ample time and simultaneously to all 
concerned, and the very notifications of such changes so often 
contain inaccuracies and uncoordinated elements, the achieve-
ment of su:ch agreement is highly desirable for purposes of defin-
ing mutual rights and obligations of the parties and for rendering 
their relations precise and definite .... However, in actuality 
what happens here is not cancellation or amendment of the con-
tract in the true sense of the word, but merely a correction in the 
text of the plan assignments incorporated into the contract, or 
else a recording of the fact that the obligations have been can-
celled and the contract has lost its force as a consequence of the 
changes which these instructions have undergone and which are 
obligatory for the parties regardless of whether they enter the 
133. Loeber, supra note 1, at 157. 
134. 6 Sbornik 38 (1957). 
135. See State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1295-96. 
136. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 10; 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 12. 
137. Instructive Letter of Dec. 18, 1962, § 11, 22 Sbornik 12-15 (1962). 
138. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30. 
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corresponding changes into the wording of the contract. 
Therefore, even if no such changes are entered, the content of 
the obligations will be determined by the new plan assignment, 
and not by the instructions reproduced in the contract.139 
If this is the correct view, and it is a view which is supported 
by other Soviet writers, 140 as well as by State A rbitrazh practice, 
it should follow that a new planning act, if it effects a major 
change, may require complete dissolution of existing contracts. In 
such cases Loeber is of the view that the old contract must be 
treated as having been rescinded, a party disagreeing with such a 
result being free to seek a decision of A rbitrazh .141 Neither the 
1961 Principles nor the 1959 and 1969 Statutes on Deliveries make 
any provision regarding the dissolution of contracts. Zamengof 
has cited two unpublished cases, however, showing that A rbitrazh 
supports the principle that new planning acts can lead to auto-
matic termination of old contracts.142 This must be understood to 
imply a simultaneous substitution of a new agreement in accord-
ance with the new plan even if no new agreement has been con-
cluded. The Myshega Armature Works 143 case and the case con-
cerning the Warehouse of the Latvian SSR 144 are additional cases 
confirming the view that State Arbitrazh practice favors this prin-
ciple. 
In practice, if the new planning act requires dissolution of 
contract, it raises the question of whether the party urging 
dissolution is liable to pay a fine or penalty to the other party for 
nonperformance. In a 1962 case145 it was held that a change in plan 
frees the customer from fines, although in Loeber's view the 
tendency is to subject that party whose superior agency issued 
the new planning act to a fine. For example, in a 1948 case146 the 
139. Id. at 31. 
140. loffe, Mints, and Krasnov; see text accompanying note 129, supra. 
141. Loeber, supra note 1, at 162. 
142. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 34-35 nn.23-24. 
143. See text accompanying note 67, supra. 
144. See text accompanying note 130, supra. 
145. SOTSIALISTICHESKAIA ZAKONNOST (SOCIALIST LEGALITY) 92 (No. 11, 1962). 
146. Isanora, Nekotoryye voprosy vliyaniya aklov planirovaniya na izmeneniye i pre-
krashcheniye dogovora postavki (Some Questions of the Impact of Planning Acts on Arbi-
tration and Cessation of a Contract of Delivery) in VYuZI, VOPROSY SOVETSKOGO GRAZHDAN-
SKOGO PRAVA (QUESTIONS OF SOVIET CIVIL LAW) 58-61 (Moscow 1955), cited in Loeber, supra 
note 1, at 163 n.163. 
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supplier delivered certain products to the purchaser, a factory 
subordinate to the Ministry of Transport-Machine Building, in 
compliance with the Ministry's orders. The purchaser refused pay-
ment on the grounds that prior to delivery the purchaser had 
become subordinate to another ministry, which changed the pur-
chaser's industrial profile in such a way that the purchaser now no 
longer needed the products. The purchaser argued that upon 
becoming subject to the other ministry's jurisdiction, it (i.e., the 
purchaser factory) had requested that its previous ministry not to 
effect delivery. State Arbitrazh, however, held the factory liable 
to pay the purchase price.147 
It seems that this principle is applicable only in cases where 
loss is as a result of a new pl,anning act. In other cases it would 
seem that the following general rule embodied in article 37 of the 
1961 principles applies: "[A] person who has not executed an 
obligation ... shall be financially liable [Article 36 of the present 
Fundamental Principles] only if there is fault [intention or 
negligence] .... "148 
Article 36 of the Principles appears to support the proposition 
that the above exception is applicable only in cases where loss 
arises as a result of a new planning act. Article 36 provides that 
"losses caused by improper performance shall not release the deb-
tor from specific execution of the obligation, except for instances 
when a planning task on which the obligation between socialist 
organizations is based has lost force." 149 Thus for example, if a sup-
plier is unable to meet his contractual obligation to deliver a cer-
tain product because his production plan is altered by a planning 
order of a superior agency to whose jurisdiction the producer has 
been newly subjected, the producer may be subject to a fine for 
non-delivery under the principle of the 1948 case cited above. 
Under Article 36, however, the producer would be exempt from 
specific performance ("specific execution of the obligation") 
147. Isanora, supra note 146, at 61, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 163-64. 
148. Art. 37, para. 1 of the 1961 Principles, supra note 29. "Person" here includes the 
enterprise as a legal person. See State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1309. If an individual 
manager appears responsible for a breach, Arbitrazh may refer him to the Procurator 
General for possible criminal sanctions. Procedure for Forwarding to Agencies of the Pro-
curator General Instances of Delivery of Incomplete Products (1964), id. at nn.9,128. See 
also Zile, supra note 6, at 219, 239-40. 
149. This principle is also expressed in 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 80, and 1959 SDG, 
supra note 59, § 81. 
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because the old plan, i.e., the source of the obligation, would have 
"lost force." 
A second exception to the general rule that liability arises 
solely through fault is the principle that defects in planning cannot 
serve as a release from contractual obligations. In Moscow Woolen 
Base v. Troitksy Cloth Factory, 150 the purchaser sued for damages 
resl:llting from the nondelivery of cloth. The supplier's defense 
was that its superior did not allocate sufficient raw materials to 
enable the supplier to fulfill its contract with the purchaser. State 
Arbitrazh held the supplier liable on the ground that the absence 
of raw materials does not serve to relieve a supplier from liability 
unless the supplier shows that it had done all that it could to 
secure materials from the superior. In Stalingrad Office v. A lchevsk 
Metallurgical Plant, 151 the buyer brought an action on the in-
complete delivery of cast iron. The producer's defense was that its 
Council of National Economy did not allocate the producer enough 
fondy. Arbitrazh held the producer liable because it was the lat-
ter's responsibility to see to it that the producer was supplied 
with adequate fondy. 
Berman observes that "[d]espite the general requirement that 
there is no liability for breach of contract without fault, the failure 
of the supplier's own sources of supply is not considered to be a 
valid excuse for his nonperformance; in such cases a fictitious fault 
is assumed to exist."152 Loeber makes the following comment on 
the stated exception: 
It seems harsh to hold a producer liable for nonperformance if 
his requests for necessary materials were not acted upon by 
planning agencies. But to decide otherwise would allow pro-
ducers to use shortcomings of planning authorities as a welcome 
excuse for their own failures ... and to rely passively on the 
mechanism of planning.153 
To minimize the liability of enterprises for planning errors of 
superior agencies and to encourage efficient planning, a radical 
proposal has been made. It has been suggested by one Soviet 
writer that enterprises be given the right to challenge planning 
150. 11 Sov. IusT. 31 (1966); see also State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1292. 
151. Note 113, supra. 
152. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 136. 
153. Loeber, supra note 1, at 148. See Stalingrad case, supra note 113; cf. Bobrovsk In-
su'lation Factory v. Khar'kov, cited in Loeber, supra note 1, at 149 n.95. 
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acts before State Arbitrazh.154 It is presently impossible for an 
enterprise to challenge or even "sue" a superior agency before Ar-
bitrazh. An enterprise may not, for example, sue to rescind an un-
realistic delivery order or to recover damages from a superior 
agency for failure to supply it with the raw materials necessary 
for the fulfillment of the enterprise's contractual obligations. Cur-
rently such disputes are settled by administrative instructions, 
and such contractual relationships are treated as matters of ad-
ministrative law rather than matters governed by the civil law of 
obligations.155 
Some have argued that ever since enterprises have been con-
ferred the right to refuse to conclude contracts for the delivery of 
unwanted goods,156 State Arbitrazh has had a right to refuse to 
compel such enterprises to enter into contracts that do not corres-
pond with the economic activity of those enterprises.157 This argu-
ment has been accepted by The Institute of Government and Law 
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, which has asserted 
that to deny this right to enterprises "would be to nullify the inde-
pendence of the contracting enterprises .... "158 
The other circumstance in which specific performance is not 
compulsory is not connected with . new planning acts, but may be 
mentioned here for the sake of completeness. This involves .in-
stances in which one party is allowed to rescind a contract in the 
event of a unilateral breach by the other. In Moscow Office v. 
Power Institute, 159 the producer was ordered to deliver pipes to 
the purchaser by February 1958. The producer was not able to ful-
fill the order in time. In March 1958 the purchaser notified the pro-
ducer that, in view of the delay, he had managed without pipes. 
Despite such notification the producer delivered the pipes in May 
1958. Arbitrazh held that the purchaser was entitled to refuse ac-
ceptance of the pipes because the delivery of those pipes was 
delayed. 
154. Kleyn, Arbitration and the Consolidation of Legality in the National Economy, 
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S.S.R. ECONOMY AND INDUSTRY, GENERAL INFORMATION 1, 12 
(Pub. No. 42, 813, trans. Joint Publications Research Service, 1967). 
155. Loeber, supra note l, at 152-54. 
156. See text accompanying notes 62 and 85, supra. 
157. Kleyn, supra note 154. 
158. Institute of Government and Law, quoted in State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 
1309. 
159. 8 Sbornik 47 (1958); see also Loeber, supra note 1, at 160 n.148. 
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D. Contract and P/,an Under the 1969 Statutes 
In 1965 the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR 
Council of Ministers introduced a program of economic reform de-
signed to stimulate Soviet enterprises to meet demands for a vari-
ety of high quality goods. Resolutions adopted by those bodies 
began a movement toward the decentralization of planning and 
granted individual enterprises greater freedom of action in the 
production and distribution of their own goods. In a major policy 
shift it was directed that the individual contract rather than the 
centralized plan was to become the basic document determining 
the rights and obligations of suppliers and purchasers in the 
delivery of all types of goods.160 To implement this directive in 
1969 Statutes on Deliveries of Producer and Consumer Goods 
were passed. 
1. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE CHANGE 
The movement a way from central planning and the confer-
ring of greater operational autonomy on enterprises did not, on the 
whole, introduce very drastic changes. Still less can the new 
Statutes be interpreted as a return to a free market. The most im-
portant changes are outlined below and the extent of their depar-
ture from the pre-1969 Statutes will be noted. 
Under the old system the supremacy of plan and the subordi-
nation of contract to plan was beyond question. In fact, delivery of 
goods could be carried out even without the conclusion of any con-
tract.161 The purpose of the new statutes is to provide for a com-
bination of centralized state planning with broad economic initia-
tives for individual enterprises. The statutes were designed to 
develop rational economic ties between enterprises, promote the 
further development of economic accountability, heighten the role 
of the delivery contract in the national economy, and intensify the 
mutual material responsibility of enterprises.162 
The feature which is novel in the 1969 legislation is contained 
in the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods.163 The Statute on 
Deliveries of Consumer Goods permits contracts to be concluded 
160. Resolution of the C.C. of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, Oct. 4, 
1965, Res. 4/10/65, § 10(1) (1965). 
161. See text accompanying notes 60 and 61, supra; 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 5(3); 
1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 6(4). 
162. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 1; 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 1. 
163. 1969 SDG, supra note 42, §§ 8(1), 6(2). 
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on the basis of a purchaser's order to a supplier prior to the is-
suance of planning acts. In this way, the contract is regarded as an 
instrument not for ending the planning process but for beginning 
it. The individual supplier's production plan, on the basis of which 
the state production plan is drafted, is therefore itself based on the 
contracts it has concluded. 
Before an enterprise contracts with another, however, it must 
first be "attached" to that enterprise by a "plan of attachment" of 
a superior agency. Upon notification of attachment the parties 
may enter into contractual relations. The notification of attach-
ment includes a specification of the overall volume and assortment 
of goods to be delivered during the year .164 The specifications com-
ply with the long-range plan for the development of the national 
economy. With the information in the notice of attachment, the 
purchaser presents its order to the supplier, specifying the 
desired goods by name, type, etc., as well as their quality, quanti-
ty and the time period for delivery .165 The order becomes a con-
tract for delivery upon acceptance in writing by the supplier .166 
As for producer goods, the 1969 Statute on Deliveries of Pro-
ducer Goods retains with some modification the old system under 
which contractual relations between supplier and purchaser are 
established; i.e. , contracts are concluded after the issuance of a 
nariad. The purchaser, however, has an unrestricted right to 
refuse to enter into the contract, and the supplier can do the same 
if he believes that the nariad does not conform to the production 
plan. The issuing agency must decide the matter within ten days 
of notification of the refusal. If that agency fails to make a ruling 
within ten days it is deemed to have accepted the refusal. 167 The 
matter can ultimately go to A rbitrazh. Either party can take the 
initiative to seek an A rbitrazh decision, 168 unlike the old system 
under which it was the supplier's responsibility to submit a pre-
contract dispute to A rbitrazh. 
It will be recalled that, even prior to 1969, under Point 8 of 
the 1962 Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, 169 enterprises 
164. 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 8(1). 
165. Id.,§ 9(2). 
166. Id., § 13(1)(a). 
167. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 9(3), 13(1)-(2). 
168. Id.,§ 26(4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 22(4). 
169. Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On Further Improvement of the 
Procedure for Conclusion of Contracts of Delivery of Equipment and Materials for the Use 
of Enterprises and Organizations," June 30, 1962, 5 RESHENIIA PARTII PRAVITEL'STVA PO 
KHOZIAISTVENNYM VOPROSAM 1917-67 gg., 658 at 127 (Moscow 1968). 
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had the right to refuse to sign contracts for the supply of un-
wanted goods. Under both the 1962 Decree and the new statutes, 
the period for refusal is ten days. Furthermore, in the pre-1969 
period, A rbitrazh could relieve a party of the obligation to take 
delivery on grounds of "economic expediency ."110 
As pointed out above, the purchaser's right to refuse was ex-
ercisable under the old system for "superfluous" or unneeded 
goods. Under the 1969 Statute on Deliveries of Producer Goods 
such qualifying adjectives have been omitted. Speer regards such 
omission as conferring an unrestricted right of refusal. 171 The 1969 
Statute on Consumer Goods, however, retains the words "super-
fluous" and "unneeded." It seems anomalous that a wider right 
should be conferred with respect to producer goods when in fact it 
is the Statute on Deliveries of Consumer Goods which seeks to 
confer greater operational autonomy on enterprises than the Stat-
ute on Deliveries of Producer Goods. It seems better to view the 
post-1969 law as introducing no change from the previous system, 
under which State Arbitrazh practice suggests that regardless of 
words such as "superfluous" or "unneeded," the purchaser has an 
unfettered discretion to reject such goods. 
Under the new Statutes a nari"ad "accepted for execution" can 
itself acquire the force of a contract without the need for a new 
agreement.112 Just as under the pre-1969 Statutes, nariady ac-
cepted and executed before the conclusion of a contract, or plan-
ning acts defining all the details of the contract, could automatically 
be substituted to govern the rights and duties of the parties con-
cerned regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a contract 
between them.173 Under the 1969 legislation, however, either party 
may now require that the contract formed through acceptance of a 
nariad be formalized by a separate contract between the parties.174 
The supremacy of plan over contract in these questions, therefore, 
remains unaffected. 
Further evidence of the supremacy of plan over contract can 
be found in the provisions concerning the amendment and dissolu-
tion of contracts in the light of planning acts. If a contract is con-
170. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 29; Loeber, supra note 1, at 146; Speer, supra note 9, 
at 527. 
171. Speer, supra note 9, at 528. 
172. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 19(b), 24(1); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 20(1), (2). 
173. See text accompanying notes 59-61, supra. 
174. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 24(3); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 20(3). 
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eluded prior to the issuance of the plan and the details of a subse-
quently issued plan require an amendment or dissolution of the 
contract, such amendment or dissolution must be formalized in 
writing in a supplementary agreement signed by both parties.175 
This applies to all contracts, including those contracts involving 
consumer goods, concluded prior to the issuance of planning acts. 
Not only does this legislation reaffirm the old principle that 
changes in planning acts require corresponding modifications in 
and, if necessary, dissolution of existing contracts, 176 but this 
legislation also reflects the ultimate supremacy of the plan. The 
view that was dominant among Soviet as well as Western writers 
before 1969, 177 that failure to incorporate necessary changes in con-
tracts leads to the automatic substitution of the relevant provi-
sions of the new planning act, would therefore still apply. The 
Arbitrazh practice holding that party whose superior agency 
issued the new plan responsible for loss arising from such change 
would likewise still apply .118 
In Armatura v. Benzostroi, the plaintiff, pursuant to a con-
tract, sold ventilators and cranes to the defendant in 1934. In 
November of the same year the defendant gave the plaintiff an ap-
plication for the purchase of more of the same products in 1935. 
The plaintiff subsequently manufactured the products, but the de-
fendant refused to execute a contract because its fund for 1935 
had been reduced. In the lawsuit that resulted, A rbitrazh held 
that "an application regarding requirements for the following year 
is a document subject to be corrected and made detailed ... by 
planning and regulating organs and cannot be viewed as creating 
an obligation in the maker ... to accept and pay for the product 
mentioned in the application."179 The principle thus embodied in 
A rmatura is that existing contracts must be modified to reflect 
subsequent changes in plans. But this principle may similarly apply 
to post-1969 cases if, for example, a nariad for producer goods is at 
variance with a pre-contract arrangement between two enter-
175. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, §§ 26(3), 27(4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 22(3), 23(4). 
176. See Section Ill, C, supra. 
177. Zamengof, supra note 11, at 30; Dozortsev, id., at 34 n.22; Loeber, supra note 1, at 
155, 159; and loffe, id., at 155 n.128. 
178. See text accompanying notes 145-46, supra. 
179. Armatura v. Bezostroi, Shkundin, Pl.anned Task and Contractual Obligation, 
SOVIET STATE AND LAW 84-85 (No. 7, in Russian, 1940), cited in Berman, Commerical Con-
tracts, supra note 5, at 225-26, Case 1. 
39
Dore: Plan and Contract in the U.S.S.R.
Published by SURFACE, 1980
68 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 8:29 
prises, or if a new planning act is issued modifying relevant spec-
ifications. 
Speer argues that a purchaser's order to a supplier con-
stitutes an "offer" under the 1969 Statutes, but that such an order 
under the pre-1969 Statutes was not an "offer" but a "pre-plan 
contract through which an individual enterprise's projected pro-
duction plan for the forthcoming year could be drafted and the 
state production plan drawn up."180 Since the contract could be 
drawn up only after the issuance of the plan, the purchaser's order 
could not, in his opinion, be an "offer." This, however, is not of 
much practical significance for three reasons. Firstly, even in the 
pre-1969 period there was a widespread practice showing pur-
chasers and suppliers concluding contracts prior to the issuance of 
nariady by simply referring to the as yet unissued nariad as the 
indicator of the contract terms.181 Secondly, as pointed out by Ber-
man, Bratus and Alekseev, the plans of superior agencies were, in 
practice, concluded in the light of draft plans and requests submit-
ted to them by lower enterprises.182 Thirdly, Speer himself points 
out that a purchaser's pre-plan order "did have the essential 
characteristics of an 'offer,' which, if accepted, bound purchaser 
and supplier to conclude a corresponding contract if the plan, 
when issued, so permitted."183 Speer further points out that this 
was often supported by Arbitrazh practice. Speer thus stipulates. 
two additional conditions for his "offer": acceptance, and permis-
sion by plan. One may justifiably ask whether Speer is not confus-
ing the concept of offer with that of the contract itself. It would in-
deed be a novel definition which asserts than an off er is only an 
"offer" after it ha~ been "accepted." 
For these reasons the argument that under the 1969 Statutes 
a purchaser's order is an "offer," while under the previous statutes 
it was a "pre-plan contract" is really academic. Legal niceties such 
as the distinction between an "offer" and a "pre-plan contract" did 
not affect the actual freedom enjoyed under the old statutes. It 
must, however, be pointed out that under the previous statutes 
the supplier could ignore a pre-plan purchaser's order, while under 
180. Speer, supra note 9, at 522. 
181. Id. at 520. 
182. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R., supra note 19, at 139-40; Bratus & Alekseev, 
supra note 69, at 26; see also notes 69-72, supra, and accompanying text. 
183. Speer, supra note 9, at 522-23. 
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the 1969 Statutes the supplier must reply to the order, either by 
accepting the order or by sending to the purchaser a draft con-
tract setting forth its own terms.184 This procedure is similar to 
the process of filing a protocol of disagreement under the old 
statutes.185 
It must also be emphasized that in concluding a pre-plan deliv-
ery contract under the present law the parties have considerably 
greater freedom in establishing their contract terms than they en-
joyed previously. Guided by the overall volume of goods projected 
for production and distribution in the forthcoming year and the 
long-range plan for the development of the national economy, the 
parties determine the quantity of goods to be delivered, the de-
tailed assortment of the goods, and the time of their delivery .186 
Free agreement as to such details and other contractual terms is 
always subject to conformity with the plan when it is issued. Any 
discrepancy between the contract and the plan must be rectified 
by modification of the contract.187 
With regard to the disposal of non-plan goods, the pre-1969 
law allowed a party to sell such goods to any purchaser independ-
ently of any planning agency. If the parties could not agree on the 
terms, the matter had to go Arbitrazh which, in effect, involved 
the intervention by a state agency (i.e., Arbitrazh) though not the 
regular planning agency.188 Under the 1969 Statutes a dispute be-
tween a prospective supplier and prospective purchaser over the 
terms of a contract for delivery of non-plan goods can be submit-
ted to Arbitrazh for resolution only if the parties have agreed on 
the essential terms of the contract.189 
2. DEFECTIVE DELIVERIES AND FINES 
No drastic changes have been introduced by the 1969 
Statutes regarding the quality and completeness of goods deliv-
ered. Under the old regime the parties could stipulate a quality 
that was higher than that required by State Standards or Tech-
nical Conditions.190 If the goods delivered did not meet the stipu-
184. 1969 SOP, supra note 42, § 22(4); i969 SOG, supra note 42, § 18(1). 
185. 1959 SOP, supra note 59, § 16(1); 1959 SOG, supra note 59, § 12(3). 
186. 1969 SOP, supra note 42.~ § 6(1), 27(1), (2), (6), 29(1); 1969 SOG, supra note 42, §§ 
6(2), 23(1)(2), 24(1), 26(1). 
187. Speer, supra note 9, at 523. 
188. Id. at 529-30. 
189. 1969 SOP, supra note 42, § 23(2); 1969 SOG, supra note 42, § 19(2). 
190. 1959 SOP, supra note 59, § 36(1); 1959 SOG, supra note 59, § 33(1); Speer, supra 
note 9, at 532. 
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lated higher standards, and met only the State Standard, the pur-
chaser could either reject the goods or pay for them without the 
stipulated surcharge (i.e., the charge in excess of that appearing in 
the price list).191 Under the new Statutes, if goods delivered meet 
only the State conditions and fail to meet the higher stipulated 
conditions, the purchaser has the same options previously avail-
able.192 The 1969 Statutes provide, however, that any fine imposed 
for defective delivery is to be stipulated by the parties them-
selves,193 whereas the previous statutes made no provision what-
soever for the imposition of fines for defective delivery. This 
lacuna was, however, filled by the State Arbitrazh, which ruled 
that in such cases the fine would be the same as that specified for 
delivery of goods not conforming to State Standards if the parties 
had so specified.194 The parties may now stipulate fines beyond 
those specified in the State Standards.195 This reflects the growing 
official concern over the large number of contractual disputes in-
volving defects in quality. Over twenty percent of A rbitrazh cases 
involve complaints over quality .196 The increased freedom of par-
ties to provide for higher fines is therefore an attempt to promote 
improvement in quality. 
If the goods delivered do not conform to State Standards or 
Technical Conditions the purchaser, under both the previous as 
well as the new Statutes, has a duty to refuse to accept or pay for 
the goods and to bring suit to exact a fine from the supplier.197 The 
prohibition against the granting of "amnesty"198 still applies. In a 
1962 ruling State Arbitrazh declared that an agreement between 
the supplier and purchaser under which the supplier was to 
replace defective goods at no extra charge and without the return 
to the supplier of the goods oridinally delivered, could not relieve 
191. RSFSR CIVIL CODE of 1964, art. 160, para.4. For an English translation see W. 
GRAY & R. STULTS, CIVIL CODE OF THE RSFSR (1965). Under the 1959 Statutes the purchaser 
had the right to refuse goods as unordered. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 54(1)(a); 1959 SDG, 
supra note 59, § 52(1)(a). 
192. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 63(1); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 64(1). 
193. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 63(2); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 64(2). 
194. Instructive Letter of July 31, 1963, No 1-1-37, 25 Sbornik 42, 45 (1966) cited by 
Speer, supra note 9, at 533, n.121. 
195. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 47(7); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 47(7). 
196. State A rbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1299. 
197. RSFSR CIVIL CODE of 1964, art. 261; see also Zile, supra note 6, at 239; and Liber-
man, supra note 31, at 48. 
198. See text accompanying notes 93-97, supra, 
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the supplier of his liability to pay the stipulated fine for the 
delivery of defective goods.199 This rule remains unchanged, and if 
an attempt is made by one party to protect the other from the im-
position of a fine, Arbitrazh may, upon discovery, direct that the 
mandated fine be paid to the USSR. Treasury instead of to the 
party normally entitled to that fine. 200 The prohibition placed upon 
the waived fines applies to all contracts and thus is not confined to 
those involving defective delivery. Thus, although enterprises 
have been given greater powers to stipulate higher fines for the 
nonfulfillment of contractual obligations, those enterprises have 
no corresponding freedom to waive fines. 201 
One way in which a buyer can protect himself from the 
seller's charge that a delivery was in fulfillment of contractual 
obligations and that the buyer's refusal to accept the goods deliv-
ered was a unilateral breach is by promptly filing a Protocol of 
Disagreement. This issue has already been discussed in a previous 
section and will therefore not be discussed here.202 Also discussed 
elsewhere is the question of nonconforming delivery (i.e., delivery 
at variance with the contract) as a result of changes in plan.203 The 
1969 legislation does not affect the principles discussed under 
those heads. 
Another relevant issue is the compensatory nature of fines. 
Both the pre-1969 Statute and the 1969 Statutes stipulate that'if a 
fine paid by one party for breach of a contractual obligation does 
not equal the other party's losses, then the party in breach must 
reimburse the other for the amount of loss not met by the fine. 204 
As pointed out above,205 however, Article 37 of the 1961 Principles 
specifies that the nonfulfillment of the contractual obligation must 
be due to the actual fault of the party in breach if liability is to be 
imposed. Thus, when the liability of a party is due to a statutory 
fine, fault is presumed. But if a party sues for a loss that is not 
199. Instructive Letter of Mar. 29, 1962, No. 1-1-9, 19-20 Sbornik 11, 14 (1962) cited by 
Speer, supra note 9, at 535, n.132. 
200. Speer, supra note 9, at 535. 
201. 1969 SDP, supra note 42, § 85(3), (4); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 87(2)-(7). 
202. See text accompanying notes 104-107, supra; in particular see Pavlodarsky Trac-
tor Factory v. "Armmashsnabsbita," text accompanying notes 107-108, supra. 
203. See Section C, 3, supra. 
204. 1959 SDP, supra note 59, § 80(i); 1959 SDG, supra note 59, § 81(1); 1969 SDP, supra 
note 42, § 88(1); 1969 SDG, supra note 42, § 90(1). 
205. See text accompanying note 148, supra. 
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covered by a fine, the other party may escape liability only by 
showing that the breach of the contract terms was not occasioned 
by his own fault. It has already been suggested above that this 
general rule admits exceptions in two cases. Firstly, when new 
planning acts have been issued and make performance impossible, 
that party whose superior agency issued the act will be held 
responsible for the loss regardless of fault. 206 The second exception 
is the rule that defects in planning cannot be pleaded as a defense 
in a suit for nonperformance or defective delivery. 201 
Finally, it may be observed that an important element of con-
tracts between Soviet business enterprises is the penalty clause. If 
the parties fail to insert such a clause it will be supplied by A rbi-
trazh when it is asked to decide a dispute arising from the 
contract.208 Thus, enforcement and penalties are to be worked out 
primarily through horizontal contractual relationships. If, however, 
the parties fail to provide for such enforcement and penalties, aver-
tical duty from a higher agency (e.g., Arbitrazh) can always be im-
posed.209 This reflects the well-established principle that the en-
forcement of fines is not only the right of the injured party but also a 
duty of the State.210 
This vertical duty is operative even when a party against 
whom the fine is to be imposed can show that the other party has 
also violated the law. For example, a supplier who has made sub-
standard delivery cannot escape liability even if he can prove that 
the purchaser failed to return the goods or has accepted a re-
placement of the goods. In such a situation the vertical duty oper-
ates against both parties; not only is the supplier fined but the fine 
may be made payable in whole or in part to the Union budget in-
stead of to the purchaser. In this way both parties are punished.211 
In some cases the acts of the purchaser may diminish or even ex-
tinguish the liability of the supplier. For example, the purchaser 
206. See text accompanying notes 145-48, supra. 
207. See text accompanying note 150, supra. 
208. Instructive Letter of the State Arbitration Agency of the USSR Council of Minis-
ters, Mar. 29, 1964, cited in Liberman, supra note 31, at 48. In Orsk-Khalilovo Iron & Steel 
Combine v. Chirchik Electrical Machinery, id. at 49, State A rbitrazh imposed a fine for in-
complete delivery to the extent of 15 percent of the value of the incomplete set of deliveries. 
209. Chelyabinsk Office of "Rosbakalei" v. Uvorovsky Sugar P/,ant, 18 Sov. IusT. 31, 
(1967), cited in State Arbitrazh, supra note 10, at 1299-1300. 
210. See text accompanying note 98, supra. 
211. Liberman, supra note 31, at 51; Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 58. 
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may store perishable goods in such a way as to hasten their deter-
ioration or he may do other acts that make it impossible to deter-
mine whether the supplier sent substandard goods. In all such 
cases the 1969 Statutes do not affect Article 37 of the Principles of 
Civil Legislation which allows arbitration agencies to reduce the 
liability of the supplier or to completely exonerate him. Also unaf-
fected by the 1969 Statutes is Arbitrazh power to levy costs 
against the party bringing suit if the party bringing suit violated 
any law concerning the delivery and acceptance of products, the in-
itiation of the suit, etc. 212 Costs usually consist of a government fee 
payable for each suit and payment to experts, if any were called. 213 
E. Conclusion 
Contracts in the Soviet Union have a dual function. They 
serve as a mechanism for the centralized regulation of the econ-
omy as well as serving to provide some means through which in-
dividual economic enterprises may exercise initiative. It appears 
preferable to view the institution of contract as a plan-
implementing mechanism rather than as a legal device through 
which enterprises can escape and exercise a function independently 
of the plan. Contracts implement the plan to the last detail by 
creating legal obligations between enterprises, and provide a mech-
anism for the imposition of fines for the nonperformance of plan 
tasks. As Loeber observes: 
[C]ontracts-and only contracts-create those reciprocal and 
equivalent relations which characterize money-commodity ex-
changes between equal economic partners. This element of recip-
rocity so essential to any economic activity and initiative is missing 
the sphere of planning .... To inject spontaneity into the working of 
a planned economy ... contracts ... were introduced .... They are 
considered to be the optimum means for linking the principles of 
planning with the principles of economic rationality .214 
It is of course true that since the early 1950's the trend has 
been toward contractual independence, and the 1965 and 1969 
reforms mark the culmination of this trend. Yet these reforms 
have been introduced to minimize or to reduce the rigid bureau-
212. Fal'kovich & Barash, supra note 20, at 62. 
213. Points 42, 44 and 45 of the 1963 Rules, supra note 26. 
214. Loeber, supra note 1, at 165. 
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cratization of economic control, and at the same time to facilitate 
plan implementation. 
The institution of A rbitrazh is, in many ways, an ingenious 
device that serves as watchdog over the plan-implementing pro-
cess. Having such powers as the power to go beyond the claims of 
the parties, to grant relief or levy fines that may not have been 
sought, to add or sever a party, to initiate suits, and to settle 
disputes as part of its public function of day-to-day economic 
administration gives the institution something more than a purely 
judicial role in the regulation of the socialist economy. The judicial 
aspect of its function has led to the establishment of a vast body of 
case law which has had the welcome effect of introducing stability 
and predictability after the havoc caused during the post-1917 
years by attempts to regulate the economy without contracts. The 
devices of Instructive Letters and Informative letters may be 
regarded as judicially guided administrative instructions which 
serve the same end. In this way Arbitrazh-made law has made im-
portant contributions to such vital fields of contract law as im-
proper performance, change of contract terms vis-a-vis changes in 
planning acts, dissolution of contracts, defective delivery, and the 
imposition of fines. 
It is primarily the work of the institution of A rbitrazh that 
has molded for contracts the role of a plan-implementing mechan-
ism. Its power to resolve what are known as "pre-contract" 
disputes embodies a doctrine that rights and duties can arise prior 
to the conclusion of contracts and can, for this reason, be the sub-
ject of pre-contract litigation. This theory leads to the conclusion 
that the ultimate source, or the "Grundnorm" to use Kelsenian 
terminology, of these rights and duties is the plan. 
Furthermore, it appears that the fewer the number of plan in-
dicators, the greater is the leeway for contractual negotiation and 
maneuvering between individual enterprises. Such leeway may, 
however, increase the number of pre-contract disputes because 
those items previously governed by plan indicators have to be 
resolved by the parties. It can be seen therefore that not only is 
the plan the source of pre-contract obligations, but the greater the 
scope for pre-contract negotiation the greater the degree of in-
dependence and initiative at the individual enterprise level. The 
conferring of juridical personality on the economic enterprise and 
the introduction of the principle of economic accountability as the 
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basis of its operations would seem to be a natural extension of the 
principle of operative independence. A future development, fur-
ther strengthening this independence, may well be the creation of 
a right on the part of a subordinate enterprise to sue a superior 
agency for errors in planning, or to challenge the validity of par-
ticular planning acts. Alternatively, A rbitrazh power to join or 
sever a party may be extended so as to enable i_t to join a superior 
agency of one of the subordinate enterprises party to the case 
before it, and to render an award against the agency rather than 
its subordinate enterprise. 
The foregoing presupposes the creation of procedural safe-
guards for the unfettered freedom of enterprises to initiate suits. 
As suggested above, procedural safeguards are weak even in 
those areas where statutory rights have been conferred on enter-
prises. 
/IL PART II: 
FOREIGN TRADE AND THE PLANNED ECONOMY 
This part will examine the place of foreign trade within the 
planned economy. Specifically, it is intended to examine the legal 
and institutional framework for the conduct of foreign trade by 
the Soviet Union, the relationship between foreign trade and 
domestic industry, and the resolution of contractual disputes be-
tween Soviet foreign trade agencies and foreign businessmen. 
This part will finally examine the legal aspects of East-West joint 
ventures in the Soviet Union within the context of the plan. 
A. The Legal and Institutional Framework-An Overview 
External business relations for the Soviet Union are based on 
the fundamental principle of state monopoly of foreign trade, first 
proclaimed in 1918 by the Decree on the Nationalization of 
Foreign Trade.215 Article 1 of the Decree provides, in part, that 
transactions for the purchase or sale of any product with foreign 
states or individual trading enterprises shall be carried out in the 
name of the Russian Republic by specially authorized agencies. 
215. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 22, 1918, "On the National-
isation of Foreign Trade." Reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TaADE MONOPOLY: 
INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS, 202 App. B (1974). See generally, H. Berman & G. Bustin, The 
Soviet System of Foreign Trade in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 25 (R. Starr 
ed. 1975). 
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The concept of monopoly was reiterated in 1922 by another 
decree216 and then again in 1925 by a resolution211 adopted by the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
The resolution provided in part that the essence of the foreign 
trade monopoly: 
[i]s that the State itself carries out management of foreign trade ... 
establishes which organizations may carry out actual foreign 
trade operations in which branches and in what volume; deter-
mines working toward the goals of improving the economy ... by 
means of an export-import plan, what and in what quantities may 
be exported from the country and what may be imported into it; 
and it directly regulates import and export and the operations of 
foreign trade organizations through a system of licenses and 
quotas.218 
The agency in which the monopoly is vested and which is 
responsible for the overall coordination of Soviet foreign trade is 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Ministry was created solely 
for this purpose in 1953. 219 
In the years immediately following its creation, the foreign 
trade monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Trade was extensive. 
However, during the period of decentralization following the 
death of Stalin, and especially as the Soviet Union emerged as a 
major industrial power, the complexities of trade and foreign 
business relations could not be handled by a single Ministry alone. 
A number of functions and agencies have been transferred out of 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade to promote greater efficiency in the 
management of foreign trade. The most important of these is the 
Committee on Inventions and Discoveries formed in 1955 and 
given concurrent authority with the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
216. Decree on Foreign Trade, Mar. 13, 1922, cited in Osakwe, Legal and Institutional 
Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade: Soviet Perspective, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83, 
95 n.34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade] 
217. Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Worker-Peasant Party 
(Bolsheviks) on Foreign Trade, Oct. 5, 1925, para. 2. Reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 
215, at 206 App. C. 
218. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 206. The monopoly concept has also been restated in 
art. 73(10) of the new Soviet Constitution of 1977. See CONSTITUTION (BASIC LA w) OF THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, Law of Oct. 7, 
1977, reproduced in W. BuTLER, supra note 7, at 3. 
219. Decree of August 24, 1953, creating the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 1 Shor. Zak 
S.S.S.R. 268 (1968). 
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over the patenting of Soviet inventions abroad.220 The Committee 
acquired the power in 1961 to sell licenses for Soviet products 
abroad and to recommend to the USSR Council of Ministers the 
purchase of licenses to foreign products.221 The Committee also 
shares its functions with what is now the State Committee for 
Science and Technology, created in 1965 and reorganized in 
1966.222 Another important agency is the State Committee of the 
USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, which 
was created in 1957.223 All the above agencies work in close col-
laboration with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
Other important agencies involved in Soviet foreign trade are 
the State Planning Gommittee of the USSR Council of Ministers 
(Gosplan); 224 the Ministry of Finance, which sets the limits to the 
amount of foreign currency that can be used by the Foreign Trade 
Ministry to purchase goods abroad; the state agency for foreign in-
surance, lngosstrakh; the State Bank of the USSR; the USSR 
Ministry of Merchant Marine, which has responsibility over inter-
national maritime shipping; and the All-Union Chamber of Com-
merce, which, apart from arranging trade exhibits to promote 
sales abroad, also operates two arbitration tribunals. The arbitra-
tion tribunals are the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission and 
the Maritime Abritration Commission.225 
Although control of Soviet foreign trade is separated from 
the control of domestic trade, foreign trade is, like domestic trade, 
220. Art. 3(a) of the Statute on the Committee on Inventions and Discoveries of the 
USSR Council of Ministers, confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, No. 274, 
Feb. 23, 1956, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, 96 n.15. 
221. Art. 6 of the Methodological Instructions on the Procedure for Preparing 
Materials on the Sale and Purchase of Licenses Abroad, promulgated by Decree of the Com-
mittee on Inventions and Discoveries of the USSR Council of Ministers, Dec. 19, 1961, cited 
in Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 98 n.49. 
222. Statute on the State Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers for Science and 
Technology, confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, October l, 1966. For 
English text, see W. BUTLER, supra Qote 7, at 129. 
223. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 98. 
224. See Statute on the State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers 
(Gosplan SSSR), confirmed by Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers, Sept. 9, 1968, as 
amended Oct. 3, 1977. For English text, see W. BUTLER, supra note 7, at 123. 
225. See J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 76-79. For the resolution of foreign contractual 
disputes by way of the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission see C. Norberg & D. Stein, 
Arbitration of US-USSR Trade Disputes in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE USSR, supra 
note 215, at 175. See also H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 49-53, and text accom-
panying notes 256-57, infra. 
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determined by the requirements of the national economic plan. 
The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) receives draft foreign 
trade plans from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which in turn are 
determined by draft plans that the Ministry receives from the 
foreign trade agencies themselves. Gosplan then draws up final 
foreign trade plans as part of the overall national economic plan 
which is then approved by the USSR Council of Ministers and 
later confirmed by the Supreme Soviet. Under Article 3 of its 
Statute, Gosplan is required in its plans to provide for the "expan-
sion of international economic cooperation and raising the efficiency 
of foreign trade."226 
More specific definition of Gosplan's powers and responsibili-
ties in foreign trade is given in Article 4 of the Statute: 
4: There shall be entrusted to Gosplan SSR: 
(i) the preparation with the participation of USSR ministries 
and departments and union republic councils of ministers of pro-
posals concerning the development of foreign economic ties of the 
USSR, the improvement of inter-state specialization and coopera-
tion of production, the coordination of plans for the development of 
the USSR national economy with the national economic plans of 
other member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance; 
(j) the working out with the participation of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade, the State Committee of the USSR Council of 
Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations, USSR ministries and 
departments, and union republic councils of ministers on the 
basis of draft plans compiled by them, draft plans for the import 
and export of goods, as well as draft plans for the delivery of 
equipment and materials for objects being built abroad with the 
technical assistance of the Soviet Union; 
(k) the drawing up jointly with the USSR Ministry of 
Finances on the basis of draft currency plans submitted by 
USSR ministries and departments and by union republic councils 
of ministers to draft composite annual currency plans (or pay-
ment balances), as well as reports concerning the fulfillment of 
such plans .... 227 
226. Article 3 of the Statute on The State Planning Committee of the USSR Council of 
Ministers (Gosplan SSSR), supra note 224. 
227. Id. art. 4(i)(j)(k). 
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B. Some Important Principles of Soviet Import-Export Law 
1. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN TRADE 
79 
Today there are approximately sixty-nine Soviet import-
export agencies or combines carrying out the bulk of Soviet for-
eign trade.228 For export purposes, each combine purchases goods 
from domestic economic enterprises and sells the goods abroad in 
accordance with the export and import plan which has previously 
been drawn up as described above by the superior state agencies, 
the Foreign Trade Ministry, Gos plan, the USSR Council of 
Ministers and the Supreme Soviet. 
Each combine and production enterprise receives an export 
plan from the appropriate ministry. The plan creates an administra-
tive obligation owed by each combine to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, and is fulfilled by the issuing of "order-requisitions" 
(zakazynariady) by each combine to the production enterprise[s] 
named in the plan. For the production enterprises, the order 
requisition creates an administrative obligation to its ministry to 
comply with the combine's order.229 
Under the Condition of Delivery of Goods for Export issued 
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, of January 26, · 1960, the com-
bine's order must indicate the plan under which the order has 
been issued as well as the name of the goods required, their basic 
technical data, quality, quantity, packaging, and shipment dates.230 
If any of these conditions becomes disputed after the order 
has been made, there is no arbitral remedy available as in the case 
of domestic contract disputes. Indeed, the tra·nsaction between 
combine and enterprise is not a contract, but the order of the com-
bine is binding on the enterprise. This binding effect puts the 
enterprise at a considerable disadvantage, which is further com-
pounded by the power of a combine to unilaterally modify an order 
which has already been issued if such modification "is required by 
228. For a list of the combines (with names and description of goods dealt in) see 
Loeber, Capital Investment in Soviet Enterprises? Possibilities and Limits of East-West 
Trade, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 338, 356 (1977-78 hereinafter cited as Capital Investment); Osakwe, 
Legal Aspects of Soviet-American Trade: Problems and Prospects, 48 TuL. L. REV. 536, 
554-59 (1974). 
229. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 129; H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 62. 
230. Article 12 of the Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export, Order of the Minister 
of Foreign Trade, Jan. 26, 1960, No. 25, excerpt reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 
219 App. G. 
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conditions of sale of the goods to foreign purchasers."231 An order 
may also be modified or cancelled if there is a ministerial prohibi-
tion of trade relations with the country in question, or if there is a 
change of plan by a superior agency (e.g., the Council of Ministers 
or the Ministry of Foreign Trade). This situation is not different 
from the automatic effect of changes in plan on domestic 
contracts. 232 
Article 28 of the 1960 Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Ex-
port establishes guarantee periods that bind the supplier-enter-
prise.233 If a long.er period of guarantee is required by a foreign 
purchaser, such a period can be negotiated between the combine 
and the supplier-enterprise.234 Similarly, the foreign purchaser is 
not bound to accept the standards of quality and packaging speci-
fied in the 1960 Conditions, and may stipulate higher standards. 
The combine may then stipulate the higher standards in its order 
to the supplier-enterprise and compensate the supplier-enterprise 
for the extra expense. 235 
As with the export of goods, there is a plan for the import of 
goods and for their distribution inside the Soviet Union. The plan 
specifies what goods are to be imported by the various combines, 
in what quantities, from which countries, and how they are to be 
paid for. 236 Here the individual enterprises have a greater say. As 
the end users of the imported goods, the individual enterprises are 
allowed to apply to their ministry for import goods as an early 
stage. The Ministry takes these applications into account before 
submitting its own overall import application to Gospl,an.231 Once 
the plan has been confirmed, the USSR Council of Ministers issues 
import permits to various supply-and-sales agencies which, in 
turn, deliver to the appropriate combine "import-commissions" re-
questing the combine to contract with a foreign supplier for the 
goods in question.238 The combine may contract with any foreign 
supplier as long as the foreign supplier is located within the coun-
try specified in the import plan. The prudent foreign supplier 
231. Id. art. 19. 
232. See text accompanying note 129, supra. 
233. Article 28 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," note 230, supra. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. art. 35. 
236. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 163. 
237. Id. at 164. 
238. Id. at 165. 
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would therefore wish to ensure not only that the particular goods 
have been authorized for import into the USSR, but also that the 
goods in question can be imported into the USSR from his coun-
try. This may not necessarily be problematic for the foreign sup-
plier since in addition to the import permit already issued by the 
Council of Ministers to the supply-and-sales agency, the combine 
itself has to obtain an import license from the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade before it can contract with a foreign supplier. Before issu-
ing the license to the combine the Ministry will carefully check the 
combine's proposed foreign supplier, the foreign supplier's coun-
try, and the proposed terms of the transaction. 239 
In the event of any dispute over the imported goods it is the 
combine's duty to use or settle with its foreign business partner 
and pass on to the supply-and-sales agency, or the end user of the 
imported goods, whatever it is able to obtain from the suit or set-
tlement. 240 
Most of Soviet foreign trade is carried out by a number of 
export-import agencies or combines. Each combine is a juridical 
person under Soviet law and specializes in a group of commodities 
drawn up by the· Minister of Foreign Trade in the form of a list 
which is generally included in the combine's constituent instru-
ment.241 A combine specializing in one group of commodities may 
not deal in any other unauthorized commodity, otherwise the deal 
may be ultra vires and therefore unenforceable.242 The foreign 
businessman should therefore ensure that the transaction in ques-
tion is authorized by his Soviet partner's commodities list.243 Other 
commodities can be added to a combine's list by means of ad hoc 
authorization from the Foreign Trade Ministry.244 In the event of 
239. H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 63; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 167. 
240. In 1960, in a case concerning the Minsk Raw Materials Center and the combine 
Raznoexport, the combine was compelled by order of State A rbitrazh of the USSR Council 
of Ministers to settle a dispute as to the quality of goods it had imported from a foreign sup-
plier, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 170. 
241. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 104. See also H. 
Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 46. 
242. H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 46; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 116. 
243. Article 50 of the RSFSR Civil Code, reprinted in W. GRAY & R. STULTZ, supra 
note 191. Under Article 49 of the RSFSR Civil Code, a contract contrary to the interests of 
the state or against public policy is void ab initio. The foreign businessman should therfore 
be aware that other Soviet statutes in addition to the combine's charter may govern the 
transaction in question. 
244. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 105. 
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any doubt as to a particular combine's authority, the combine's 
foreign business partner could always insist that the combine seek 
clarification, approval or further authorization, as the case may be, 
from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
2. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF 
FOREIGN TRADE CONTRACTS 
Soviet law establishes certain formalities for the creation of 
valid foreign business contractual relations. The most important 
requirement is that all contracts must be in writing and signed by 
two persons on the Soviet side, the chairman of the combine (or his 
deputy) and a person authorized to sign foreign trade transations. 
Monetary obligations, such as bills of exchange, need the signa-
tures of the combine's chairman (or his deputy) and its chief ac-
countant. 245 If the transaction is concluded outside Moscow or 
abroad, it needs the signatures of two persons holding a power of 
attorney from the combine's chariman.246 
Just as all oral contracts have to be reduced to writing, so 
must all subsequent amendments or variations to the contract. 
The signature requirements relating to new contracts apply to 
amendments as well.247 
Observance of the above formalities is especially important in 
the event of a dispute. Thus, an unrecorded oral agreement be-
tween a Soviet combine and a foreign corporation to resolve all 
disputes by arbitration would be invalid inside the Soviet Union.248 
Likewise an arbitral award made abroad under an unrecorded 
agreement would be unenforceable in the Soviet Union, regardless 
of where the contract was concluded.249 As Osakwe has observed, 
"[t]his is a strict departure from the universally recognized princi-
245. Id. at 107. 
246. Law No. 1 of Dec. 26, 1935, Procedure for Signing Foreign Trade Transactions 
(1936], cited in Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 107, n.81. 
247. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 107. 
248. Article 45 of the Civil Code of the RSFSR provides that "[n]on-observance of the 
form of legal acts in foreign trade or of the procedure for signing them (Article 565) results 
in the invalidity of such acts." Article 565 of the RSFSR Civil Code provides in part that 
"[t]he form of legal acts concluded by Soviet organizations in connection with foreign trade 
and the procedure for signing such acts are governed by legislation of the USSR, regardless 
of the place in which they are concluded." For an English translation of the Civil Code of the 
RSFSR see W. GRAY & R. STULTS, supra note 191. 
249. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 
EAST AND WEST 306 (1970). See also H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 45. 
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pie of lex loci contracti and is a perilous trap into which an unwary 
foreign businessman may fall." 250 
In the interest of speedy dispute settlement not only should 
the contract be in writing, but provision must also be made re-
garding the forum in which controversies should be litigated and 
the system of law under which they will be resolved. The trend 
seems to be toward arbitration being fixed in Western Europe, 
with Stockholm being a favored site.251 The foreign businessman 
should, however, be aware that the Soviet combine, while it does 
have wide discretion in negotiating the terms of a contract, may 
not always be able to accept the forum and law preferred by him. 
As Pisar has observed: 
The unitary nature of the commercial structure affords the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade ample opportunity to require its 
licensed trading instrumentalities to forego submissions to alien 
forums, alien laws and other "unapproved" clauses. The party's 
formal autonomy to express contractual intentions is thus largely 
negated by the lack of a will independent of the state's.252 
3. IMPORT ANT PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF 
SOVIET FOREIGN CONTRACT LAW 
Soviet enterprises themselves are never parties to foreign 
trade contracts. The contract is between a foreign party and the 
appropriate combine. In the event of breach of contract by either 
party, it is either the combine that sues the foreign partner or the 
foreign partner who sues the combine alone, even if in the latter 
case the breach was due to the fault of the supplier/producer en-
terprise. The combine may then sue the enterprise before State 
Arbitrazh in a separate action.253 Thus, for example, if under a 
typical export contract the combine has to pay damages to its 
foreign partner for defective goods, the 1960 Conditions of Deliv-
ery of Goods for Export allows the combine to recover the dam-
250. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 108. 
251. Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade: 1972-74: A Summary, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 39, 63 
(1974). See also C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225, at 179. 
252. S. PISAR, supra note 249, at 299. Arbitration could of course be arranged before 
the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission in Moscow or the Maritime Arbitration Commis-
sion, either which would probably be preferred by the Soviets to almost any other venue. 
See H. Berman & G. Bustin, supra note 215, at 49. 
253. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 144. 
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ages from the enterprise.254 If the foreign trade contract provides 
for arbitration by the All-Union Chamber of Commerce's Foreign 
Trade Arbitration Commission, and if the foreign partner seeks 
arbitration in that forum, the combine being "sued" may bring the 
enterprise into the suit as co-defendant, if the enterprise and the 
foreign plaintiff both consent. This procedure is not specifically 
provided for by legislation but it has been developed by the Com-
mission itself. 255 Ordinarily, the Commission handles only 
"disputes arising from foreign trade transactions, in particular 
disputes between foreign firms and Soviet economic 
organizations."256 Furthermore, any agreement by a Soviet com-
bine to arbitrate before the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commis-
sion has the force of law in the Soviet Union and an a ward of the 
Commission itself is binding.257 
Finally, the principle of liability based on fault, discussed in 
relation to domestic contracts,258 also applies to foreign trade with 
some modifications. If, for example, a combine knowingly exports 
defective goods, it cannot recover from the supplier-enterprise the 
damages that the combine might have to pay the foreign pur-
chaser .259 However, the combine can, in such a situation, always 
sue the supplier-enterprise for statutory penalties under the Con-
ditions of Delivery of Goods for Export, since statutory penalties 
can be collected without proof of damage. 26° Furthermore, penal-
ties continue to accumulate against the enterprise until there is 
actual performance. This can be changed only if the enterprise's 
ministry intervenes and negotiates a change with the combine.261 
In the event of a change of plan ordered by a superior agency, 
254. Article 80 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export", supra note 230, 
provides: 
Financial disputes connected with delivery of goods for export, in which one of the 
parties is a foreign trade organization, shall be resolved in Moscow in the pro-
cedure specified in the Statute of State A rbitrazh. 
Other disputes connected with delivery of goods for export shall be resolved 
by the appropriate arbitrazh under established jurisdictional rules. 
255. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 144 n.124. 
256. Article 1 of the Decree of the Central Executive Committee and Council of 
People's Commissars, "On the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All-Union 
Chamber of Commerce," June 17, 1932, cited in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 159 n.123. 
257. Osakwe, Barriers to United States-Soviet Trade, supra note 216, at 99 n.53. 
258. See text accompanying notes 99 and 148-49, supra. 
259. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 146. 
260. Id. at 145-46. 
261. Id. at 148. 
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the principle of liability based on fault is modified in foreign trade 
contracts in the same way that it is modified for domestic con-
tracts. 262 Thus, if a change of plan requires the combine to cancel 
an export order already placed with a supplier-enterprise, the sup-
plier-enterprise has no remedy against the combine even if the 
goods have been prepared and shipped. Similarly, the combine is 
not liable if cancellation was due to a revocation of an export li-
cense or a prohibition of trade relations against the country in 
question issued by the appropriate authority .263 As was already 
noted,264 a combine can also unilaterally modify a prior order if this 
is "required by the conditions of sale of the goods to foreign pur-
chasers."265 
These modifications to the rule in favor of the combines 
reflect the privileged position which the export combines continue 
to enjoy internally under the Soviet law of foreign trade. 
C. Some Pertinent Contractual Problems of East- West Joint 
Ventures within the Planned Economy 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid rise in East-West trade since the late 1960's has 
been characterized by the development of new forms of business 
relationships between Eastern and Western enterprises. As far as 
the Soviet economy is concerned~ its planned nature and the mo-
nopoly of the State in foreign trade have kept it relatively insu-
lated from foreign business participation inside the Soviet Union. 
Foreign participation has been limited to economic cooperation 
agreements involving sales of equipment, licenses, entire produc-
tion units together with technical assistance to set them in opera-
tion, subcontracting of components, collaboration in research and 
development, and co-production.266 However, all of these types of 
agreements associate the parties in a contractual relationship in 
which they clearly maintain their separate identities and ex-
change goods and services on the fixed-payment basis. The rela-
262. See text accompanying notes 145-49, supra. 
263. Article 41 of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," supra note 230. 
264. See text accompanying note 231, supra. 
265. Article 19, of the "Conditions of Delivery of Goods for Export," supra note 230. 
266. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, JOINT VENTURES IN EASTERN EUROPE: A THREE 
COUNTRY COMPARISON 10 (1974). This work was published under the auspices of the C.D. 
Howe Research Institute and the Canadian Economic Policy Committee. 
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tionship is terminated upon the completion of the transaction. 
There are, consequently, no economic arrangements at present in 
the Soviet Union between foreign business firms and Soviet econ-
omic agencies involving joint management and the sharing of prof-
its or losses.267 Examples of such associations, often called joint 
ventures, do however exist in a number of eastern European coun-
tries such as Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania.268 
East-West joint ventures established in the three socialist 
countries mentioned above are distinguishable by the mechanism 
that each country has adopted to regulate currency and account-
ing problems. All Romanian joint venture operations are in for-
eign currency and the joint venture is said to create an exclusive 
foreign currency "enclave" within the local monetary system.269 In 
Hungary, joint venture accounting is done under the "calculation 
system" whereby transations are undertaken in both hard foreign 
currency and local currency depending on whether the transaction 
in question is a local one or an external one.270 In Yugoslavia the 
"integration system" is used whereby the joint venture is fully in-
corporated into the national economic order. All accounting is 
done in local currency .211 
A joint venture is likely to be a much more complex undertak-
ing than any of the more common forms of industrial cooperation 
presently existing between East and West. As such, the joint ven-
ture contract would need to make detailed provisions for property 
267. Berman, Joint Ventures Between United States Firms and Soviet Economic 
Organizations, 1 INT'L TRADE L.J. 139, 144 (1975-76) (hereinafter cited as Joint Ventures). 
A joint venture is essentially a contractual arrangement between Eastern and Wes tern 
enterprises under which an identifiable entity is created to undertake joint-production 
marketing and other activities. The parties establishing the entity contract to pool their 
productive resources, and undertake to manage its operation jointly and to share all of the 
risks associated with the venture. 
268. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 266, at 27, 45, 61. See generally 
Scriven, Joint Venture Legislation in Eastern Europe: A Practical Guide, 21 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 633 (1980); Note, The Legal Framework for American Direct Investment in Eastfrn 
Europe: Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, 7 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 187 (197 4); Dagon, 
Cooperation Agreements and Joint Ventures with Socialist Business Associations: The 
Hungarian System, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 752 (1973); Morse & Goekjian, Joint Investment Op-
portunities with the Socialist Republic of Romania, 29 Bus. LAW. 133 (1973); Sukijasovic, 
Legal Aspects of Foreign Investment in Yugoslavia, 37 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 474 (1972). 
269. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 347. 
270. Pedersen Joint Ventures in the Soviet Union: A Legal and Economic Perspective, 
16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 390, 400 (1975). 
271. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 347-48. See generally Friedman, The Con-
tractual Joint Venture, 10 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 57 (1972). 
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rights, management, risk-sharing, prices, profits, currency and ac-
counting mechanisms, enterprise operation, dispute settlement, 
securing regular supplies of needed materials from domestic supp-
ly sources, and integrating these needs into the national plan.272 It 
would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss all the legal and 
economic ramifications of joint ventures in the USSR. The present 
section will therefore, in accordance with the general aim of the 
study, be limited to an examination of the relationship between 
plan and contract (i.e., the joint venture contract) and the possible 
methods of dispute settlement. 
2. THE JOINT VENTURE CONTRACT AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 
As one of the essential characteristics of a joint venture is 
shared management of the enterprise, a major question which 
arises is whether such management is possible in a centrally plan-
ned economy. Under the Soviet Constitution the State has an abso-
lute monopoly over foreign trade, while internally the economy is 
planned and administered under a hierarchical system of adminis-
trative authorities. 
For a foreign firm to enter into a joint venture contract inside 
the Soviet Union, the foreign firm would need direct access to its 
Soviet partner and the ability to exercise a minimum of opera-
tional influence on it. It would also clearly be in the interest of the 
foreign firm to ensure that its Soviet counterpart is acting intra 
vires and that the contract itself conforms to all the formal re-
quirements of Soviet law, especially that it be in writing. 
None of these requirements pose insurmountable barriers to 
the creation of j~int ventures in the Soviet Union. The present ca-
pacities and powers of Soviet foreign trade combines make them 
suitable partners for joint venture agreements. There is an almost 
total separation of foreign transactions from domestic trade. The 
foreign trade combine is given considerable latitude in negotiating 
the terms of foreign contracts and enjoys certain ptivileges not 
available to the domestic enterprise.273 It has been said that Soviet 
foreign trade combines, as juridical persons and as the sole repre-
sentatives of the state in matters of foreign trade, can incur any 
kind of contractual obligation they desire, even if it is in contradic-
272. See Scriven, supra note 268, at 642-56. 
273. See text accompanying notes 231 and 263-65, supra. See also S. PISAR, supra note 
249, at 298. 
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tion to domestic law, as long as the contract does not exceed the 
authority granted in the charter.274 The charters of the combines 
are themselves usually couched in very broad terms. A typical ex-
ample is the Charter of the combine Stankoimport, which provides 
that in order to carry out its functions the combine shall have the 
right to: 
(a) conclude contracts both in the USSR and abroad, con-
clude all kinds of transactions and other legal undertakings ... 
sue and be sued in courts and arbitral tribunals; 
(b) construct, acquire, alienate, take or let on lease, both in 
the USSR and abroad, enterprises pertinent to its activity; 
(c) acquire, alienate, take or let on lease all kinds of movable 
or immovable property, both in the USSR and abroad; 
(d) establish both in the USSR and abroad ... branches, of-
fices, representatives, and agencies, and participate in any type 
of combine, society, association, or organization whose activity 
corresponds to the tasks of the combine.275 
There seems, therefore, to be no legal restriction either in the 
Constitution or in practice that would prevent a combine from con-
tracting a joint venture with a foreign firm. The joint venture 
could then itself enjoy the same status as a combine, the contract 
being the charter. Likewise, there is no restriction that would pre-
vent exemption of the joint venture from bureaucratic control 
from the central administration or from the requirements of the 
national economic plan itself.276 
It would be in the interest of both parties to ensure that the 
contract is as detailed as possible. From the Soviet point of view 
the more detailed the contract the more predictable it becomes; 
the greater the predictability under the contract, the greater will 
be the ability of the parties to define and control their activity in 
advance. This in turn would allay any fears that the central plan-
27 4. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 410. 
275. Article 6 of the Charter of the All-Union Export-Import Combine "Stankoimport," 
reprinted in J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 216 App. F., Stankoimport specializes in exports 
and imports of machine tools, forging and pressing equipment, roll turning lathes, foundry 
equipment, measuring machines and tools, instruments, hard alloy products, abrasive pro-
ducts and bearings; art. 5 of the Charter. The above quoted formulations from Article 6 of 
the Charter of Stankoimport appear in the charters of nearly all combines and have been 
restated in Article 10 of the Statute of the AU-Union Economically Accountable Foreign 
Trade Combine approved by the Council of Ministers of the USSR, May 31, 1978, cited in 
Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 354. 
276. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 407. 
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ning agencies might have of laissez-faire economics creeping into 
the socialist economy. From the viewpoint of a foreign partner, 
the more detailed the contract, the greater will be the protection 
given to the foreign partner's investment, and the more satisfied 
it will be that the appropriate Soviet agencies and combines will 
behave in accordance with the best interest of the venture. 
The contract should specify how the joint venture should be 
freed from the restrictions of the planned economy. Some of the 
most important restrictions which could be avoided include "direc-
tive planning, unlimited inspections, freedom from changes in 
plans or orders without prior consultation, absolute dependence 
on Soviet sources of supply, turnover taxes, and success indicators 
other than profits."277 Thus, for example, the joint venture con-
tract should be specifically insulated from Article 234 of the Civil 
Code of the RSFSR which provides that changes in the national 
plan may cancel contracts; nor should such changes be allowed to 
interrupt or in any way jeporadize the joint venture's sources of 
supply within or outside the Soviet Union.278 
It is with regard to securing the joint venture's supplies within 
the Soviet Union ~hat the joint venture's needs would require some 
integration into the national plan. Also to be intergrated would be 
the sales of the finished product by the joint venture to Soviet enter-
prises. Such sales could be regarded as foreign transactions (i.e., 
between an appropriate foreign trade combine on the one hand and 
the joint venture on the other). These sales would be treated as 
conventional import contracts, regulated by the general import-
export law and requiring incorporation into the foriegn trade 
plan.219 
While the sales of finished products to Soviet enterprises 
would need some integration, securing the joint venture's supplies 
from Soviet sources would need more detailed planning and incor-
poration into the system of material-technical supply, and, 
therefore, the plan. Such incorporation would, however, be in the 
interests of the joint venture since once the plan is ratified by the 
Supreme Soviet, it becomes binding on all the lower enterprises, 
including those acting as supply sources to the joint venture.280 
277. Berman, Joint Ventures, supra note 267, at 150. 
278. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 418. 
279. See generally text accompanying notes 236-40, supra. 
280. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 418-19; J. QUIGLEY, supra note 215, at 79. 
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The needs of the joint venture would, however, be something 
which the joint venture would decide for itself and transmit, 
through an appropriate agency or combine, to the central authori-
ties for incorporation into the national plan. Upon incorporation, the 
joint venture would become bound to accept the supplies (subject to 
appropriate safeguards in the contract as to quality, production 
deadlines, and penalties) with the knowledge that its stipulated 
domestic supplies are guaranteed. The actual procedure would take 
much the same form as that of a conventional export contract: the 
appropriate combine would issue an "order-requisition" (zakaz-
nariad) to the domestic enterprise through the Ministry.281 The 
enterprise would be bound to produce and deliver the materials or 
goods in question, which the combine would then sell to the joint 
venture. 
One authority is of the belief that because of the joint ven-
ture's inevitable reliance on the involvement in the network of ma-
terial-technical supply, "the entire operation of the joint venture, 
down to the last details, should, if it is to succeed, be cleared in ad-
vance with at least a dozen different Soviet bureaucracies, start-
ing with Gosplan and ending with the local soviet."282 
The joint venture legislation of Romania, which is seen by 
many to be an attractive model for the Soviet Union,283 provides an 
elaborate procedure for the formation of joint ventures in Ro-
mania. It requires the drawing up of a feasibility study, a memor-
andum of association, a contract of association, and appropriate 
statutes, all of which are reviewed at different stages by various 
state agencies including the State Planning Committee, the Min-
istry of Labor, the Bank of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, and the Council of Ministers.284 If the Soviets follow the 
Romanian model, elaborate prior screening procedures may be 
necessary for the formation of joint ventures in the Soviet Union. 
As for sales by joint ventures in the Soviet Union to non-
281. See text accompanying notes 229-235, supra. See also H. Berman & G. Bustin, 
supra note 215, at 61. 
282. Berman, Joint Ventures, supra note 267, at 150. 
283. C. McMILLAN & D. ST. CHARLES, supra note 266, at 3; Pedersen, supra note 270, at 
401, 406-07. 
284. Article 16 of the Joint Companies Decree, Decree 424 of 2 Nov. 1972, Concerning 
Constitution, Organization and Operation of Joint Companies in the Socialist Republic of 
Romania, cited in Burgess, Direct Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe: Problems and 
Prospects of Romania's Joint Venture Legislation, 6 LA w & POL. INT'L Bus. 1059, 1079-83. 
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Soviet buyers, there should be no reason why this could not be 
done directly by the joint venture itself, especially if, as suggested 
above,285 the joint venture has been granted the status of a foreign 
trade combine. Such sales would be "foreign transactions" from 
the Soviet viewpoint, and since all foreign trade is treated dif-
ferently from domestic transactions, such sales would have little 
impact on the domestic plan.286 A power to buy and sell abroad 
directly by the joint venture could always be stipulated in its 
original contract or charter. If this is found to be impossible, the 
contract could provide for the joint venture's foreign purchases 
and sales through designated foreign trade combines.287 
Whatever the procedure adopted, it has been recommended 
that all, or at least most, of the joint venture's transactions should 
be carried out in hard currency since prices and profits are cen-
trally established in the Soviet economic system. 288 
In conclusion, it would seem that as far as the national econ-
omic plan is concerned, complete exclusion of the joint venture 
therefrom would be neither possible nor desirable. The joint ven-
ture contract, however, in making detailed provisions governing 
the activity of the venture, should spell out in what ways the joint 
venture is to be freed from the restrictions of the plan. 
3. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ARISING FROM THE 
JOINT VENTURE 
Disputes between economic enterprises operating domesti-
cally in the Soviet Union are settled by the special system of econ-
omic courts known as the State Arbitrazh.289 This institution 
285. See text accompanying note 276, supra. 
286. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 423. 
287. The idea is partly borrowed from Pedersen who suggests that the joint venture 
contract could: 
[P]rovide for acquisition of many of its supplies from abroad by including ... a 
provision that it is "expected" that certain supplies will be purchased abroad by 
designed FTO's [Foreign Trade Organizations] under long-term contracts and 
according to the specifications desired by the joint venture. This procedure would 
avoid joint venture participation in the foreign trade monopoly [on the assumption 
that the joint venture is not granted FTO status] while simultaneously giving the 
joint venture authority to place supply orders through FTO's directly without go-
ing through the appropriate ministry. 
Id. at 423-24. 
288. Id. at 424-30. This would be following the Romanian example. Article 22 of the 
Romanian Joint Companies Decree, cited in Burgess, supra note 284, at 1083. 
289. See Part I, Sections A and E of this study, supra. 
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serves as a watchdog over the plan-implementation process as a 
whole. It is because of the clear orientation of the institution 
toward state interests, and its commitment to the primacy of the 
plan, that A rbitrazh would not prove acceptable to the foreign in-
vestor as a forum for resolving joint venture contractual disputes. 
On the other hand, if the joint venture is insulated from the unde-
sirable restrictions of the plan to the satisfaction of the foreign 
partner, it is not inconceivable for the foreign partner to agree to 
submit to Arbitrazh those disputes in which the national plan is 
not relevant. 
Perhaps a more attractive alternative to the foreign investor 
would be the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All-
Union Chamber of Commerce.290 The Commission's jurisdiction can 
be said to extend to joint venture disputes since it is empowered, 
in part, to handle "disputes between foreign firms and Soviet 
economic organizations."291 
Third-country arbitration would be another possibility. The 
joint venture legislation of Romania provides for the settlement of 
disputes either in the local law courts or by arbitration.292 In the 
case of arbitration, the parties may use the Foreign Trade Arbi-
tration Commission of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce or an 
international tribunal.293 Thus in one Romanian joint venture, the 
parties chose arbitration under the procedures of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland,294 while in another, 
arbitration was stipulated under the procedures of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce in Paris.295 
As seen with regard to conventional Soviet import-export 
contracts296 the Soviets have shown a willingness to accept arbitra-
290. Decree of the Central Executive Committee and Council of Peoples Commissars 
on the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All Union Chamber of Commerce, 
June 17, 1932, SZ SSSR (1932) No. 48, item 281. 
291. Id., art. 1. See also C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225 at 177, and text accom-
panying note 257, supra. 
292. Article 38 of the Romanian Joint Companies Decree, cited in Burgess, supra note 
284, at 1099. 
293. Burgess, supra note 284, at 1099. 
294. Joint venture between Zahnraderfabrik Renk AG of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the Romanian Industrial Central for Machine Construction at Resita, Oct. 6, 1973, 
cited in Burgess, supra note 284, at 1061. 
295. Joint Venture between Control Data Corp. of the U.S. with the Romanian In-
dustrial Central for Electronics and Vacuum Technology, Apr. 4, 1973, cited in Burgess, 
supra note 284, at 1061. 
296. See text accompanying note 251, supra; C. Norberg & D. Stein, supra note 225, at 
180-84. 
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tion in neutral third countries, with Stockholm being a popular 
site. If the parties choose such arbitration to settle joint venture 
disputes, they would nevertheless have to stipulate the arbitra-
tion procedures to be followed. 
It has also been suggested that since some joint venture dis-
putes could involve complex technical matters, there may be an 
agreed procedure of "on-site arbitration" by technical experts 
rather than trained arbitrators.297 It is, however, possible that 
both parties may prefer limiting the role of technical experts to a 
purely advisory level to promote an amicable settlement, while 
providing for formal arbitration as a last resort. The chosen arbi-
tral tribunal could always be empowered, or even obliged, to take 
into account expert testimony and advice before rendering a deci-
sion. 
D. Conclusion 
In the regulation of the domestic industry in the Soviet 
Union, contracts are seen to have a dual role as a mechanism for 
the central control of the economy and, within certain limits, as a 
means of exercising enterprise initiative. It is also evident that 
the legal institution of contract and the quasi-judicial/administra-
tive institution of Arbitrazh both operate on the fundamental prin-
ciple of the supremacy of the plan.298 
This basic principle remains inviolable in the sphere of for-
eign trade as well. In the foreign trade sphere, the fundamental 
principle of state monopoly over foreign trade serves to buttress 
the primacy of the plan. Plan changes made by the agencies en-
trusted with the foreign trade monopoly can nullify agreements 
between foreign trade combines and domestic enterprises without 
the domestic enterprises having any remedy. The effect of a 
change of plan on domestic contracts is, of course, identical. 
Yet, because of the inherent nature of foreign trade, there is 
not, and cannot be, a Soviet judicial or administrative agency 
parallel to A rbitrazh having compulsory jurisdiction over all 
foreign trade disputes. Dispute settlement, the choice of law, and 
the forum of settlement are left to the agreement of the combine, 
with appropriate checks from above, and the foreign party. The 
function of A rbitrazh in domestic trade as watchdog over the plan-
297. Pedersen, supra note 270, at 436. 
298. See Part I, supra. 
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implementing process is, in the sphere of foreign trade, exercised 
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Each combine, once it receives 
its export plan, owes an administrative obligation to the Foreign 
Trade Ministry to fulfill its export orders. Imports, too, are strict-
ly overseen by the Ministry. Even after import permits have been 
issued by the Council of Ministers, the import combine, before con-
tracting abroad, must obtain another import license from the 
Ministry. 
It is perhaps due to the absence of an A rbitrazh-type agency 
overseeing foreign trade, and bringing to heel erring enterprises, 
that Soviet foreign contracts are so painstakingly scrutinized by 
superior agencies, and why Soviet law prescribes strict pro-
cedural formalities for the conclusion of foreign trade contracts. It 
would also be due to this reasoning that the Soviets prefer to 
eliminate as much uncertainty as possible by insisting on detailed 
provisions in the contract. 
While the institution of contract vis-a-vis the plan is clearly in 
a subordinate position for domestic as well as foreign trade, there 
is one possible area of foreign trade where there could be tension 
between plan and contract. This is the field of joint ventures. It is 
a tension, however, which can be resolved, given some flexibility 
and a desire to compromise on the part of both parties. 
There would seem to be strong motivation on both .sides_ for 
the formation of joint ventures.299 For the West, the chief attrac-
tions would be wider markets, cheaper and stable labor costs·, and 
the opportunity, not available under other forms of industrial 
cooperation, to share in the management and control of an enter-
prise to which it contributes capital and technology, in return for a 
share in the profits.30° For the Soviet Union, there would be the 
possibility of access to Western markets, obtaining much needed 
up-to-date foreign technology, capital, and new managerial skills 
and techniques.301 Such benefits have already persuaded some 
socialist countries to push aside ideological considerations and 
favor joint ventures. It is conceivable that the same could happen 
in the Soviet Union in the near future. 
299. See Scriven, supra note 268, at 634, 662. 
300. Capital Investment, supra note 228, at 338-39. 
301. Id. See also Pedersen, supra note 270, at 394-97. 
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